State as coordinator of interests in society

Despite putting limitations on sovereignty, pluralists assign the State the role of a thereby required to serve the purpose of securing common interest by taking cognizance of interests of all the groups and associations. In the process of public service or social service, the State assumes the role of a coordinator and facilitator of common interest. In this role, the State has been variously designated as ‘association of associations’ (Barker) or ‘organization of organizations’ (Lindsay) or ‘societies of societies’ (Figgis). These formulations give the State a role of coordination and regulation in society.

Ernest Barker does not accept the concept of real personality of groups in the sense of will and consciousness of their own. However, he admits the juristic claim and claim of priority of associations and groups vis-à-vis the state. He has captured the nature of the coordinating and adjusting role of the state when he says that ‘The state as a general and embracing scheme of life, must necessarily adjust the relations of associations to itself, to other associations and to their own members.’¹³ We can compare how Durkheim, as mentioned above, shared Barker’s concern for coordination amongst associations by the state.

Lindsay differentiates the State from other organizations by its compulsive and comprehensive membership as contrasted to the voluntary and selective membership of other organizations, and by its coercive functions. He conceded control by the State over corporations within it, provided citizens are prepared to give the state such powers.¹⁴ However, for Lindsay these attributes by no means constitute a character that can be designated as sovereignty.

Similarly, Dr Figgis regarded the State as the communitas communitatum (society of societies) and assigned to it a distinctive function and a superior authority as an agency of coordination and adjustment’. And this was required as ‘each of these groups must by the state be restrained from acts of injustice towards one another and towards others; and it is largely to regulate and to ensure that they do not out-step the bounds of justice that the coercive power of the state exists.’¹⁵

Mary Parker Follett, an American, who also subscribes to political pluralism, in fact, presents a somewhat divergent pluralistic tendency when she says that ‘the home of my soul is in the state.’ She looks upon the state as a unifying agency and not merely a coordinating agency whereby the State acts upon the individuals not only through various groups but also directly. She echoes an unpluralistic chord when she says, ‘no group can enfold me because of my multiple nature … nor number of groups can enfold me.’¹⁶

Thus, we can see how pluralism, despite its commitment to a pluralistic society, remains within the framework of priority of the State. Coker sums up the dilemma of the pluralists so far their dream of non-sovereign state is concerned when he says that ‘pluralists have not made it clear how they would conserve the beneficent services rendered by the State without permitting it to exercise sovereignty—implying a normally compulsive and comprehensive membership with the exclusive authority to apply law.’¹⁷ Even an ardent advocate of political pluralism, Laski admits that ‘legally no one can deny that there exists in every State some organ whose authority is unlimited.’ We see that political pluralism, as a whole, does not reject the idea of the State altogether. At most, they reduce it to a level of any other association in society but reluctantly end up giving primacy to the State. In most of the cases, priority is given to the State and theory of the State is reformulated to fit in the ideas on groups.