State and Other Associations in Society: Is the State First Among the Equals?

From this primacy of society and social needs of human beings, flows another logical argument that supports the pluralist’s view. MacIver asserted that social forms like families or churches or clubs, owe neither their origin nor their sustenance to the State. For him, associations in society serve different interests of human beings and that include emotional, cultural, economic relationships.

In his writings, we can find certain reasons for treating the State at par and in league with other associations in society. Firstly, he maintains that ‘other associations are as native to the soil of society as the State itself.’⁵⁰ The State is not their creator and even is incapable of refusing existence of such associations as family or church. For MacIver then the State belongs to the same category of associations as the family or the church and like family and church, it consists of a group of members organized in a definite way for limited purpose. Its limitation arises from not being able to fulfil the purpose of the family or the church or the trade union or cultural associations. The State cannot, for the most part, make or unmake them. Hence, MacIver declares, ‘the organization of the state is not all social organization.’⁵¹ Secondly, from the limited purpose that each association, including the State, serves, flows the basis of authority that MacIver employs to declare parity between the State and the associations. For him, ‘every association of any magnitude has grades of authority and control analogous to those of the state.’⁵² For example, business corporations and their managers and stakeholders or church hierarchy and its membership also entail authority and control amongst themselves. Similarly, authority of the State relates to its people and their will or the will of the majority as reflected in the government. Thus, the State has an essential character of a corporation. As a corporation is recognized by law and has certain rights and obligations, the State has ‘definite limits, definite powers, and responsibilities.’⁵³ Thirdly, unlike Lindsay and Barker who either directly or indirectly, attribute to the State the role of regulating associations and corporations, MacIver presents a different opinion. He denies the State any role or power of either controlling or regulating the internal affairs of these associations. And in denying this, MacIver says, ‘Today the great associations are neither parts of the State nor its mere subjects. They exist in their own right no less than it. They exercise powers that are their own, just as surely as does the State.’⁵⁴ MacIver limits the scope of authority of the State by invoking variety of purposes and interests being served by different associations and denies the State any regulating power. By denying any regulating power he seeks to secure the pluralist logic of not giving the State any primacy over other associations.

Given this, how does the State then regulate to serve the common interest and give a form of unity to the whole system of social relationship? We can find two specific references in the writings of MacIver that may enable us capture an answer to this question. In his book The Modern State, he argues that the State stands for common interest, though not for the whole of the common interest. He accepts that the objective of the State is general. This would be possible only when the State resolves the conflicting interest of different associations to make ‘the common interest sufficiently unified to admit of political expression and legal regulation’. Differentiating between the State and other associations, MacIver says, ‘the other associations are limited primarily by their objective, which is particular, whereas the State is limited primarily by its instrument, which is particular while its objective is general, within the limits so imposed.’⁵⁵ Thus, while the objective of the church is to seek religious loyalties of its members, the State does not have a particular objective to associate its people but seeks a general objective of political expression and legal regulation. The State is limited by its instrument and it is based on the will of the people which for MacIver is will of the majority or the dominant will.

Secondly, in his book, The Web of Government which it seems presents a revisit to MacIver’s thought on the role of the State, he ‘makes a distinction between two types of organizations—those which serve the emotional and cultural interests of men and cannot be regulated by the State; and those which serve the economic interests of different groups, and have to be regulated to serve the common interests.’⁵⁶ MacIver feels that given the uniqueness and requirements of differences in cultural and religious expressions, the State should not coordinate, as this would destroy their characteristics qualities. However, he gives regulating space to the State with respect to associations formed to serve economic interests. He says, ‘economic activities cannot be left to the free arbitrament of individuals and groups without serious interference with public order.’⁵⁷ He cites the examples of ensuring minimum wages to employees, maximum hours of labour, prudent use of one’s property so that the source of livelihood of others is not harmed as some of the important considerations to regulate economic activities and associations.

MacIver, despite building a strong pluralist ground for pushing the state back, in the end, concedes regulatory functions to the state. However, he remains true to his ground by holding that the State cannot capture all the expressions of the individual and as such, cannot claim their overarching loyalty.