Popular Sovereignty

The doctrine of political sovereignty stops short of assigning a philosophical basis of supremacy to the political community and remains a reluctant doctrine of popular sovereignty. Political sovereignty gives the electorate primacy while popular sovereignty attributes power to the masses/people. Popular sovereignty attributes sovereignty to the people or the community which has a ‘common consciousness of common good.’ We have seen how Althusius in his anti-royalist formulation defended the sovereignty of the people. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, anti-monarchical formulations like those of Marsiglio of Padua (he described the principle of supreme authority of the people as republicanism, which he invoked to restrict the powers of the papacy), William of Occam, Thomas Barclay, Johannes Althusius et al argued for the inalienability of the supremacy of the people vis-à-vis the monarch. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the American Declaration of Independence approvingly asserted that governments derived their just powers from the consent of the governed. James Bryce in his Modern Democracies states that popular sovereignty is ‘the basis and watchword of democracy.’³⁵

The fullest expression of this doctrine can be found in Rousseau’s concept of General Will. Rousseau’s concept of General Will, which he defined as the ‘common consciousness of the common good’, provides strong philosophical ground to the concept of popular sovereignty. In this, the community retains and exercises full supremacy and is the source of all powers. The philosophical formulation of General Will may be understood from Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Philosophical Formulation of General Will

We find the doctrine of General Will is the basis of the community retaining all powers and is the source of all rights and justice. In fact, individual freedom lies in following the general will as this is not external to individuals but a reflection or synthesis of their real will. And since it is a synthesis of the real will of individuals willing common good, it can neither be divided nor represented. Furthermore, it can be the only true source of all laws, rights, freedom and justice. The interest of the General Will and the interests of the individuals willing the common good cannot diverge. It is this situation that leads to true freedom and liberty for the individual. And if an individual fails to follow this ‘he can be forced to be free’. As such there is no resistance to the General Will. In this form, Rousseau’s doctrine of General Will is a doctrine of maximalist political obligation on the part of the individual. The General Will is marked with the characteristics of unity, permanence, righteousness, absoluteness, inalienability and non-representability.

Thus, Rousseau’s concept of General Will provides a philosophical basis for popular sovereignty where the people are supreme. We may recall Althusius’s concept of the social contract and how he makes ‘sovereignty reside in the people as a corporate body’. This is because the people as a corporate body are incapable of parting with sovereignty as it is a characteristic of this specific kind of association, called the State. Sovereignty is never passed or alienated into the possession of any ruling class or family. We find in Althusius and Rousseau philosophical grounds for popular sovereignty.

However, this form of sovereignty is possible in small democracies. As indicated above, popular sovereignty gives birth to certain confusions regarding its location as well. Writers and theorists have used terms like ‘the community’, ‘the people’ and ‘the electorate’ interchangeably which stand for an indeterminate and unorganized mass. Due to this confusion we may end up blurring the distinction between political and popular sovereignty.

Broadly, critics have sought to discount the philosophical basis of popular sovereignty by criticizing Rousseau’s General Will doctrine. L. T. Hobhouse has criticized the distinction between ‘actual’ will and ‘real’ will. He doubts that the real will is based on the consciousness of common good. If we extend the logic of Hobhouse in a market society which has competition and profit-making as primary motives, the consciousness of the common good may not stand the test. However, for Rousseau, the understanding emerged from his belief in the basic goodness of men.

Harold Laski has criticized the concept of popular sovereignty and feels that the theory of Rousseau is ‘an impossible fiction’.³⁶ Laski admits that Rousseau’s doctrine of popular sovereignty and the doctrine that unlimited power in society should be vested in the people as a whole has been the theoretical basis of a number of popular revolutions like the American and the French. However, he maintains that the sovereignty of the General Will could not have operated even under the modern conditions of representative government. Laski’s criticism emerges from the inoperability of the concept of popular sovereignty. Rousseau gives a restricted role to government and tends to disallow representative institutions while the General Will (the State) gets overwhelming powers. In this situation, how is the government to function? It is either by frequent meetings of the assembly of all citizens, i.e., in the direct manner or by perpetual plebiscites. Laski asks if this is possible to do so in large states when it is difficult even in small states. For Laski, this is possible only through some kind of majority rule. Hence, he concludes that popular sovereignty in the sense of the people legislating, adjudicating and administering themselves is an impossible fiction and not in the realm of a working hypothesis. However, it should not be lost sight of that Laski, being an exponent of political pluralism, does not accept the concept of either popular sovereignty or legal sovereignty. Merely because he criticizes the lack of institutional arrangements should not lead us to conclude that popular sovereignty is not worthy of consideration.

In fact, we can say that the concept of popular sovereignty gains significance in not only furthering the cause of democratic ethics but also seeking to resolve the primary thematic concern of political theory in the form of the State-versus-individual antithesis.

Notwithstanding Laski’s criticism, the doctrine of popular sovereignty contains certain significant ideas like: (i) the State should reflect the common good and should exist for the good of the people, (ii) if otherwise, the General Will, i.e., the basis of the State stands defeated, (iii) the government should be directly responsible to the people, (iv) mere representation through periodic elections is not enough, constant vigil of public opinion and people should be there.