Machiavelli and Raison d’etat as basis of political obligation: Machiavelli provides the keyhole to peep into the post-Renaissance political theory and why does the state require its subject to pay obedience. In his Prince (1532), Machiavelli put forth the justification that the interest or the end of the state, which is acquisition and maintenance of power, is prime and all means are justified to secure that. This implied that the state has its own interest and reason and the doctrine of raison d’etat, reason of the state, may trace its link from there. By doing so, Machiavelli took the state out of the medieval labyrinth of the state–church controversy, on the one hand, and justified the authority of the ruler on secular ground away from the divine right speculation. In such a scenario where interest of the state was primary, political obligation was unconditional and unlimited. In fact, reason of the state arguments might have provided fodder for the development of absolutist states30 in Europe.
Doctrine of consent as basis of political obligation: While the raison d’etat as a secular basis and divine rights as religious basis were employed for justifying authority of the state and ground for seeking obedience of the subjects in sixteenth- and seventeeth-century Europe, a major theoretical change was introduced by the doctrine of social contract. Three thinkers, Hobbes (Leviathan), Locke (Treatises on Civil Government) and Rousseau (The Social Contract) talked about the contractual basis of the state and its authority/sovereignty. This means, the source of authority of the state was made out to be the consent of the people themselves who to escape from the undesirable condition of the state of nature, contracted with each other to establish the state and institute a common authority and government. This doctrine of social contract became the cornerstone of political obligation based on consent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and informs the principle of representative governments in present democracies. It would be appropriate to recall a few important points considered necessary from the point of view of political obligation.
Before Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau discussed their theory of contract and consent in late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, Johannes Althusius advocated contract as the basis of emergence of society and government.31 In dealing with the question of obligation to the community, Althusius supported the idea that a rational way of conceiving obligation was to attribute it to promise of the individuals and this promise was the contract made by them. This makes obligation self-imposed and not imposed by force. The principle of self-imposed, consent-based political obligation was supported by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, Samuel Pufendorf in his book on natural and international law in 1672, John Locke in Two Treatises on Civil Government and J. J. Rousseau in The Social Contract. In present times, John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice has used principle of contract and consent to propose his concept of distributive justice and self-imposed political obligation.
Hobbes’s contract by the people is against the undesirable and brutish, solitary, poor, nasty and short condition of the state of nature. It is a contract amongst the people to hand over all the individual freedom that they have to one body—the Leviathan or the Sovereign. The latter, however, is neither a party to this contract nor bears any obligation. Hobbes makes the consent of people to the Leviathan absolute, irrevocable and unlimited; otherwise the only prospect is reversion to the state of nature. In the state of nature, no one’s product of labour is certain and no one’s life secure. In Hobbes’s scheme, the primary motive or objective for such consent is to secure the condition of life under a sovereign authority. Implication of Hobbes’s theory of consent is absolute obligation of the subjects/citizens towards the political authority without reciprocal duty from the latter.
It does not give much room for resistance either. This is based on the understanding that existence of the state and authority is better by any standard than absence of the same. Thus, Hobbes requires political obligation to any authority in existence and justifies claim of the ruler to seek obedience even though the ruler is bad and oppressive. It is possible that Hobbes was writing to justify the hold of Stuart kings in England against the demand of the people. However, his fear of collapse of the authority and reversion to the state of nature in case there is resistance and end of political obligation is due to lack of proper differentiation between the state and the government, which Locke introduced. As a result, as Heywood says, ‘For Hobbes, citizens are confronted by a stark choice between absolutism and anarchy’32 and hence they need to offer full political obligation.
Leviathan’s authority is legitimate, primarily, because subjects have consented to its power. Virtually, nothing can be pleaded against its power, neither right nor justice, nor law of nature, nor law of God, nor conscience, nor any natural right except one, not to kill someone. The latter is very logical for the doctrine of contract and consent, which makes Hobbes concede the right to resistance. Primary natural right that justifies existence of the Leviathan is right to life of the individual. If Leviathan fails to protect, disobedience to its authority is justified. Leviathan ‘cannot command a man to kill himself’ and ‘man owes no obligation to an authority that fails to protect him.’33 This is the limitation on Leviathan and ground for resistance conceded by Hobbes.
Unlike Hobbes who favoured almost an absolute form of political obligation, Locke presented a doctrine of limited consent and limited political obligation. Locke portrayed the very cause of social contract as protection of certain natural rights, namely rights to life, liberty and property. These rights are available in the state of nature but are not fully enjoyed due to lack of an interpreter, executor and adjudicator of natural law. To protect and enjoy these rights, a social contract is entered into. This means rights, which are available to the individuals before their entering into a political community must not be violated in the civil society or by the state authority. To what benefit the state and its authority is if the very rights for which they are instituted are circumscribed and violated. The consent of the individuals in contracting and surrendering certain rights to escape from the state of nature is twofold: one, to form a society and political community, which will be represented by a government as a trust of this political community, and two, to institute a government with a legislator, executor and adjudicator. Locke’s doctrine of consent and contract result in a limited government and differentiated from the state or political community. Unlike Hobbes, government is a representative of the political community and the latter is politically supreme.
The implications of his doctrine of limited consent are: (i) it makes state and government separate, (ii) allows political supremacy to stay with the political community, (iii) treats government asa trust of this political community for protecting the natural rights of life, liberty and property, and (iv) makes failure to protect these rights a breach of the trust reposed in the government by the society, and hence reason for resistance and revolt. A revolt or rebellion against a government that has failed in its trust, unlike Hobbes, does not mean dissolution of the state. In Locke, it is only change of a government. This is what was happening during the English Revolution, 1688. Since the political community reposed supremacy, it can change the trust from one government to the other.
Interestingly, by using the same doctrine of contract and consent, while Hobbes sought to put the fear of anarchy if the Stuart kings were overthrown by the Revolution, Locke showed a direction for limited constitutional government. Locke’s is a doctrine of limited consent and limited political obligation; political obligation to the extent the government protects natural rights.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, son of a watchmaker father and an affluent mother, born in Geneva, despite having struck affection for a number of ladies of all age groups, swore by the beauty and divinity of Theresa to whom he bore several children without being married to her, wandered without much social bondage, lived almost in exile and confessed of his misfortunes and conspiracies his friends forged against him.34 This Rousseau of ours celebrated the noble savagery of humankind and the innate goodness of the human nature.
In Rousseau, we find two accounts of social contract, one in his Discourses on Origin of Inequality and other in his The Social Contract. We will confine ourselves to the second account in which Rousseau gave primacy to civil society and its General Will as the protector of real liberty of the individuals. As a result of social contract, General Will emerges as the supreme authority. It represents common interest and collective good, as opposed to the particular or private will that represents the selfish interest of individuals. General Will, being representative of the real will (will that is in every member of society, which wills common good) of all members of the society is a repository of real liberty. In following General Will, every one follows, his or her own will and does not subordinate to any other authority that is external to him or her self. Rousseau identified true liberty with civil liberty that comes in submitting to the General Will. As such, Rousseau’s is a doctrine of unlimited, unconditional and absolute political obligation, as it is an obligation to common good. Since true freedom lies in following the General Will, any one deviating from that, Rousseau says, will be ‘forced to be free’.
Amongst the three social contractualists, Hobbes and Rousseau demand unlimited political obligation and Locke postulates limited political obligation. Hobbes’s doctrine results in absolute sovereignty, Locke’s in political sovereignty and Rousseau’s points towards popular sovereignty. Hobbes and Locke were witness to the Glorious Revolution of 1668 in England that was directed against the Stuart dynasty. This was a prime example of political resistance and defiance of political obligation. Hobbes thought it was anarchic, Locke considered it a result of breach of trust of the people by the rulers. Two other revolutions that came after more than a century, the American Revolution in 1776 and the French in 1789 were also prime examples of political resistance. Rousseau’s writings are considered to have influenced the French Revolution. In a way, the doctrine of consent and the political resistance that manifested in the three revolutions, charted the road for political obligation based on constitutional and limited governments, rule of law, representative character of the authority and supremacy of the people as source of all political power.
Thomas Paine, an Englishman who left England and went to America, supported the American and the French Revolutions and republican form of government. He was opposed to the British monarchical system. He wrote, The Rights of Man in celebration of both the French and the American Revolutions and against Edmund Burke’s conservative reaction to the French Revolution. While Tom Paine was not a supporter of social contract theory, he supported the natural right doctrine on teleological basis.
Conservatism and natural duty as basis of political obligation: Edmund Burke (1729–97), who is considered ‘as the father of Anglo-American conservative tradition’ opposed the doctrine of rights of man and argued that mutual obligations and rights of people rooted in tradition and experience are more important than abstract conceptions of rights. His Reflection on the Revolution in France is considered a testament of conservative position against revolutionary upheaval. He argued that rights of man not rooted in tradition and not based on mutual obligations is abstract, destabilizing and speculative, as it recognizes pre-social rights. Burke was a supporter of rights and obligations rooted in historical experience and accumulated wisdom.
Implication of conservative tradition for political obligation is that it seeks to root obligation of the individual as moral and social duty and is based on mutual respect of the rights of others, respect for institutions of the society, established authorities and law, customs and tradition. Political obligation becomes what Heywood says, ‘natural duty’ and moves away from the idea of voluntary behaviour and consent. Conservative perspective on political obligation poses an alternative to the consent basis of political obligation. In contemporary times, Michael Oakeshott (1901–90) and Irving Kristol (1920–) have supported conservatism. Oakeshott in his Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays has supported ‘non-ideological style of politics’ and political obligation on the basis of customs, tradition and civil association.
State as reflection of a higher goal: Idealists such as Hegel (Philosophy of Right) and Bosanquet (The Metaphysical Theory of the State) attributed the state an external, higher and idealistic purpose and treated it as the ‘march of God on earth’. Hegel holds that Spirit or the divine reason manifests in each institution and the state is the highest reflection of this divine reason or Spirit. For Hegel, history is the history of journey of Spirit and the state is a special manifestation of this journey. This journey of Spirit is also a ‘progress of the consciousness of Freedom’. By associating the state with some divine purpose, Hegel gives it an exalted position. Since the state is a manifestation of Spirit and divine reason, individual freedom can only be realized in this divine journey. Individual freedom is to be realized only when one submits to this divine reason. Hegel’s argument means complete submission of the individual to the will of the state. Hegel’s is a doctrine of unlimited and absolute political obligation. The state, even though imperfect should always be obeyed, as disobeying would amount to disobedience to the divine scheme of things.
Common good and fulfilment of man’s moral capacity as the basis of political obligation: T. H. Green, an English idealist, supported Hegelian’s concept of ‘Divine Spirit or Reason’ and maintained that ‘The political life of man is “a revelation of the Divine Idea’’’35 Green supports Hegel’s idea that the state is supreme and source of all rights. However, despite similarity with Hegel, Green swings towards an individualist position and does not consider the state as an end itself. Unlike Hegel, the state becomes a means for an end, the end of ‘full moral development of the individual that compose it. The state in Green becomes a remover of obstacles that comes in the way of moral development of the individual. Previously, we discussed Green’s idea of moral freedom that makes him a supporter of welfare state and positive liberalism. Unlike Hegel, Green does not demand unlimited political obligation and does not support that the state is an end in itself. Green’s glaring difference with Hegel appears in his position that the individual may be justified in disobeying the state.
Primarily, Green does not justify resistance and treats the state as the sole source of right. He does not grant any right to disobey the law of the state merely on the ground that it runs against freedom of action of individuals. Green’s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, however, provide that resistance can be justified on social grounds. Green treats the state a provider of common good. For him ‘will, not force is the basis of the state’. This ‘will’ is general will, ‘common consciousness of a common good’ which people possess. This is ‘will for the State, not the will of the State.’ The State is obliged to provide common good, failing which it loses its claim. Further, Green though treats the state as the source of rights; he feels that human beings carry certain claims by virtue of their very human personality. These claims are ideal or moral claims and ought to be recognized by the state as rights.
Green presents a doctrine of conditional political obligation: Green’s state is neither an end in itself, nor does it seek unlimited obligation based on force. Its claim to political obligation is subject to providing common good, recognizing the ideal rights of the people and removing the obstacles in the way of development of moral personality of the people. His Hegelian influence recognizes that one will never have the right to resist, but his individualist inclination concedes that one may be right in resisting. This means, one should be justified in disobeying the state only when certain conditions prevail. Wayper lists these conditions as ‘(a) if the legality of the command objected to is doubtful, (b) if there are no means of agitating for its repeal, (c) if the whole system of government is so bad, because it is so perverted by private interests that temporary anarchy is better than its continuance, or (d) if anarchy is unlikely to follow resistance, then only should the State be disobeyed.’36 In short, Green would support resistance and disobedience when it is obvious that within the existing circumstances full moral development is impossible. Unlike Green, Bentham would ask for political obligation on the basis of greatest happiness of the greatest number.
No political obligation and class struggle in a capitalist system: Marxian school endorses neither the view that the state is based on consent, nor that it can be a manifestation of a higher goal, nor an agency of common good. The state within a capitalist mode of production, or for that matter, state per se is an exploitative instrument. In a capitalist system, the state serves the purpose of the owners of the means of production. It is a class instrument and cannot claim for obligation from all. In a class divided society, there is no question of political obligation and the proletariat are engaged in class struggle against the exploitative class whose instrument the state is. Even in the socialist society after the proletarian revolution, when the state exists, it is under the dictatorship of the proletariat and again serves as a class instrument, though now in the hands of the majority. Marxian view provides no basis for political obligation. In fact, class struggle is a radical concept of resistance and revolution. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin advocated such a position.
Consent through Hegemony: Neo-Marxian theoretician, Antonio Gramsci suggested that the state in the capitalist system deploys Hegemony for seeking consent of the proletariat. Hegemony refers to the ability of the ruling class to exercise power and ensure domination by seeking consent of those over whom it dominates. In his Prison Notebooks (written during his imprisonment) Gramsci analysed that educational (schools), cultural, religious (churches) and social (family) institutions create such conditions and generate such ideas in which the capitalist system is legitimized. Ideas, behaviour, customs, morality and social norms are propagated in such a way that they appear as what Gramsci calls ‘common sense, the philosophy of the masses. This means that the capitalist system legitimizes itself through cultural, ideological and intellectual domination. Legitimation and justification of the state in a class divided society is achieved through hegemony and domination. Hegemony is based on consent and not force, and is tacitly achieved.
Another concept, false consciousness, has also been employed by Marxian and neo-Marxian theoreticians to present how reality in a capitalist system is garbed through delusion and mystification to hide the exploitative character of the system. Marx, Engels and Lenin analysed this concept. Herbert Marcuse in his One-Dimension Man (1964) suggests that instead of ‘false consciousness’, as suggested by Marx and Engels, the term ‘false needs’ is more appropriate to capture the situation in a contemporary capitalist society. From this perspective, it appears that the capitalist state presents itself as if it is based on consent of the people, is capable of reconciling different interests and providing common welfare; though this cannot be the case in a class divided society. Hegemony and false consciousness are means that produce legitimation for the system.
Political obligation and legitimation crisis: As we have noted earlier that political obligation is related to legitimacy, i.e., if political obligation has to be forthcoming, legitimacy of the state and its institutions should not be in question. Focusing on the issue of legitimacy, some contemporary Neo-Marxian theorists such as Jurgen Habermas (The Legitimation Crisis), and Klaus Offe (Contradictions in the Welfare State), have discussed the concept of legitimacy in the capitalist and welfare states. The idea of legitimation crisis relates to the problem of political obligation. Both Habermas and Offe maintain that the state in capitalist societies is in a peculiar position where it has to maintain the condition of capital accumulation and free market (e.g., less taxation and less regulation by the state) as well as avoid social crisis and demand of an electorate (e.g., more taxation and public expenditure). In order to balance the two, there is always a legitimacy deficit on the one side or the other. As such, the state is caught in a crisis.37 Offe suggests that the state in a capitalist system is neither a negative state nor a neutral arbiter but only a protector of a set of institutions and social relationships necessary for domination of the capitalist class. What Habermas and Offe suggest is that a state caught in a legitimacy crisis may not command uniform political obligation or at least, may not have a lasting legitimacy for commanding political obligation.
Denial of political obligation: Anarchist, Gandhian and anti-colonial perspectives present a case of resistance and deny any political obligation. Anarchism treats state as an ‘unnecessary evil’ and seeks to abolish it. In an anarchist’s view, there is no political obligation. Gandhi’s view on state is that it is repository of brute force and must be resisted. His method of resistance is that of passive resistance and civil disobedience, same as Thoreau propagated in America against slavery during the 1860s. Obligation under colonial state is also denied. In fact, no duty to obey such a state, which is based on colonial domination and national subjugation, can be pleaded for.
Political obligation under political system framework: In political theory, concept of political obligation is linked with the concept of state and its authority. After the development of the concept of political system as model of analysis of political process, how do we locate the concept of political obligation? If we look at the definitions provided by Easton and Almond of political system, we find that binding, authoritative and legitimate force are the characteristics of the political system. Easton defines political system as ‘that system of interactions in any society through which binding or authoritative allocations (of values) are made’. Almond’s definition of political system is also indicative of the same characteristics: political system ‘… performs the functions of integration and adaptation by means of the employment, or threat of employment of more or less legitimate physical compulsion …’ Given the binding or authoritative characteristic of political system and availability of threat of legitimate compulsion, political obligation or willing obedience is already assumed by both Easton and Almond. It appears that political system analysis does not seek any new ground or limit of political obligation than already sought by the theorists of the state.
From the analysis of grounds and limits of political obligation, we find that there can be as many grounds for obeying the state as many to deny and rebel. While the Greeks and particularly, Aristotle invokes the criteria of good life and prior purpose of the state (teleological) as ground for political obligation, the contractualists invoke consent of the people (contractual) as ground for political obligation. Conservatives rely on natural duty as the ground for political obligation; Green seeks it on the basis of common good and Bentham on greatest happiness of the greatest number. Locke and Green, however, also talk of the limit of obligations and provide conditions in which it ends. For Locke, when natural rights are violated by the government and for Green when common good is not served or when conditions for moral development are not created, political obligation becomes doubtful. Though democracy and representative governments render consent as a credible ground of seeking political obligation, this consent must be conditional on welfare and common good of the people. We have the analysis of Gramsci and others staring at us and telling that consent or not, legitimation goes on and if we agree with Noam Chomsky, consent is manufactured to seek subordination. When the limits of political obligation are reached, obedience ends and right to resistance, rebel and revolt become an entitlement.
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