We have discussed about sub-cultures within political cultures. It is generally agreed that all political cultures are mix and most of them heterogeneous. Heterogeneous and fragmented political cultures are considered unfavourable for democratic stability. Lack of uniformity in political culture could be due to several factors:
- Presence of traditional and modern elements
- Mix of parochial-subject and participant orientations
- Presence of mass and elite political cultures
These are issues related to the configuration or make up of political culture. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba’s (eds) Political Culture and Political Development have analysed the configuration of political cultures, particularly from the point of view of ‘culture of the rulers or power holders and that of the masses, whether they are merely parochial subjects or participating citizens’.42 One implication of analysing political culture of the masses and the elite is to find out the elements of support or resistance from the masses for the policies and programmes of the elite Which may include modern nation-building, secular centralized authority, democratic set-up with universal adult suffrage, multi-party competitive elections, active participation of citizens on rational and non-parochial lines and social modernization and economic development. According to Pye and Verba, those who deal with power and have responsibilities in government, ‘develop outlooks on politics different from those of the people who remain observers or marginal activists. This difference can be in terms of the orientation, policies and programmes. It is concluded that difference between the mass and the elite cultures remains in most democratic societies despite the elite pretending to share the spirit of the citizenry and the citizenry feigning intimate knowledge of working of the government. Degree of homogeneity between the elite and the mass cultures, i.e., both having modern and participant orientation and the nature of relationship e.g. supportive, will determine the nature of the political system.
Studies based on this model focus on either the elite or the mass culture according to the nature and relationship that prevails between the two. For example, in some developing countries where leadership is more important for modernization, focus is generally on elite political culture. The masses are seen as generally engrossed in traditional, agrarian and rural context. Generally, the elite-mass political cultures model is also aligned with modern—traditional dichotomy in the developing countries. It is also possible that elite political culture in a developing country coincides with the political culture of a particular ethnic, tribal or social group, which is dominant. For example, Pye and Verba, citing Donald Levine, report that ‘in Ethiopia the elite culture is intimately associated with the general culture of a particular community, Amhara’. This is a case of elite culture aligned with dominant subculture. However, in countries such as India, given the diversity and pluralistic nature of society, elite culture may not bear alignment with the subculture of any ethnic, caste or religious community. Here, the elite culture is generally identified with English educated intelligentsia; upper echelons of civil and military bureaucracy; modern educated leadership combined with Gandhian and traditional idioms of political mobilization, protest and participation; industrial and financial managers, technocratic class and non-residents, partial-residents Indians and internationally nomadic Indians.
Myron Weiner’s analysis of political culture in India, ‘India: Two Political Cultures’ in Pye and Verba’s (eds) Political Culture and Political Development follows the same elite culture and mass culture model. His main thesis is that India’s political culture is divided into two—elite culture and mass culture. He finds elite culture ‘relatively homogeneous’ and mass culture ‘extensively divided and fragmented according to caste, religion, and linguistic communities.43 Weiner feels that the two cultures can get integrated when the modern component of mass culture replaces the modern component of the current elite culture. A generally distributed modern mass culture would also become the basis of elite culture.
Post-independent India adopted a liberal constitution, participative democratic polity, secular, welfarist and socialist values and policy of mixed economy where planned intervention co-exists with private entrepreneurial initiatives. Reactions to these policies have been different from different set of people. Westernized English educated leadership and bureaucracy in principle accepted it, religious right group opposed this as against the tradition of the country, majority of the masses with their ‘rising expectations’ groped to figure this out. However, introduction of the universal suffrage and operation of the democratic institutions led to mass political participation. Notwithstanding the nature of mobilization and exercise of electoral right (‘patron-client’, ‘vertical mobilization’, wave, block voting, anti-incumbency, voting as per caste associations, etc.) participation of the people has been indicator of their democratic aspiration. However, despite the operation of the participative democratic polity, Weiner finds a gap between the elite political culture and mass political culture. Elite political culture is characterized by the support and idiom of the urban and English educated intelligentsia, all-India political leadership, civil and military bureaucracy, etc. The mass political culture, on the other hand, is characterized by traditional elements who are more active at the regional, state and district-local levels. Elite-mass political culture division is analogous to centre-periphery division in behaviour and political goals.
Weiner feels that neither the mass political culture is wholly traditional nor the elite political culture is wholly modern. While some aspects of the mass culture are adaptive to national goals, elite political culture also carries traditional idioms. He finds that the though the elite political culture is critical to the mass political culture, its understanding of the latter is limited. Myron Weiner finds that some aspects of the government activity have been helpful in spreading mass political culture. This means that spread of mass political culture is largely a creation of the government. He identifies three activities that have supported spread of mass culture:
- Policy of governmental expansion through intervention in resource allocation, dispersal of economic and industrial activity, control and regulation and expanding activity of government at all levels leads to increased interaction between the people and the governmental set-up.
- National policies related to dispersion of power through decentralization, self-government, rural and bloc extension programmes, cooperative movements etc. increases the involvement of the people at the lower levels. It also has implication for strengthening the locally dominant and powerful people.
- Democratization of power through abolition of princely states, privy purse, zamindari, land reforms, reservation of seats in public offices to certain groups, etc.
Effect of expansion, decentralization and democratization has been large-scale people’s participation in government, electoral arena and self-government. Implication of this can be seen in two ways: one, that it helped dominant castes and economically powerful people at rural and district level to use government-provided opportunity to enhance their already present power, and two, in addition to the powerful people, those who can manage numerical strength, even though economically less powerful, can get access to the institutions of the government and hence to public offices that are connected to distribution of governmental resources such as public distribution system, bloc and district level contracts, cooperative patronage etc. It is not uncommon that seeking political offices in a decentralized and democratized environment is treated as ‘status position’. Analogous to caste and landed status position, political office as a status position becomes an integral feature of mass political culture.
Another feature of the mass political culture is dominance of caste, linguistic, religious and provincial idioms of mobilization and participation. In fact, after Weiner’s study in the late 1960s, political mobilization in the 1970s and early 1980s are characterized by massive mobilization of Other Backward Castes (OBCs) and Most Backward Castes (MBCs) in terms of horizontal mobilization, i.e., similarly placed castes combined as associations and sabhas. Along with this, it is also noticed that various provincial and regional political parties have emerged with social base as caste, linguistic or ethnic groups limited to certain areas in the region of the state. While the caste phenomenon provides traditional a social element to mass political culture, emergence of political parties at the regional and state level signifies dominance of regional and provincial political elites. It is possible that elites at the provincial or state level, though largely based within mass political culture, keep its interaction channel open with the elite political culture. This phenomenon helps in coalition making between political parties at the provincial and central levels. In fact, coalition between national and state or regional political parties provides a platform of interaction between mass and elite political idioms and objectives.
Another important feature of mass culture is the perception of and reaction to the bureaucracy and administration as corrupt, self-serving, consideration based on caste, relations and religion. Corruption, nepotism and inaction characterize mass perception of bureaucracy and administration.
As a result, of state-led opportunities, mass political culture has not been conducive to the achievement of the goals and targets set by the elite political culture. Mass political culture requires patronage (subsidized water, electricity, food grains) while elite political culture insists on economic development, infrastructure building, implementation of programmes and schemes. Although there are modern elements in the mass culture and traditional elements in the elite culture, still there is gap between the two.
Weiner’s analysis however has not dealt with the class aspects of the elite versus mass culture or within the mass culture itself. Pranab Bardhan’s study on ‘dominant proprietary classes’ in India which includes the rich farmers, industrial capitalists and white-collar workers and professionals reveal that they enjoy bargaining power and put pressure on the state for bargaining resource allocation in their favour. This powerful group influences input flow and policy proposals and play an important role in interest articulation. Whether it falls within the mass culture or elite culture is not clear. Secondly, mass culture is fragmented and regionally and provincially variegated. Within the mass culture also, it is not that people use similar idioms and political means. Historical factors such as pre-independence land relations, residency in British or non-British areas, politically mobilized or passive observer during the struggle for Independence, impact of social reform movements, etc. have also shaped the nature of mass political culture.
Rajni Kothari in his Politics in India has differentiated between two types of identities—regional and linguistic identities, on the one hand, and caste and community identities, on the other. He suggests that regional and linguistic identities are new identities and cause for much of political conflict while caste and community identities are not. He opines that ‘the former informs the political exchanges among the higher elites while the latter provides the stuff of mass politics’.44 Kothari suggests that regional and linguistic identities, rather than caste and community identities, pose a problem of transfer of loyalty to national identity. Thus, Kothari finds traditional elements within both elite and mass culture.
One important factor noted by Rajni Kothari which has a bearing on the interaction of the elite and mass culture is that of ‘conception of authority as arbitration’.45 Culturally, superior-subordinate hierarchical relationships prevail in the Indian tradition. This implies decision or resolution by consensus through the intervention of a higher authority (guru, headman, king, higher functionary of king). Decision-making, resolution of conflict and settlement of dispute is done by arbitration than by negotiation and bargaining. Kothari feels that this cultural element continues in present-day India and the mass political culture accept ‘authority as essentially arbitrative’. This explains why many a times, elite intervention is required in mass culture to arbitrate. A prime example however would be the culture of ‘High Command’ intervention to mediate and arbitrate political disputes at regional and provincial level party functionaries. Kothari feels that ‘arbitration’ rather than ‘negotiation’ characterizes ‘bargaining culture’ of India.
Kothari feels that the traditional modernizers who are in charge of ‘state district organizations, caste federations, and rural Panchayats and cooperatives’ would provide a bridge between the mass and the elite culture by interpreting the political culture.
Leave a Reply