Pluralist Perspective on Distribution of Power

One of the powerful refutations to the elite model comes from the pluralist model of power distribution. Pluralists find fault with the elite model because the latter confuses between power in one scope say, economic or intellectual or political as if, it leads to power over other scopes. For example, people having intellectual ability or organizational power or economic power, will exercise influence over areas of others. Pluralists refute this assumption and develop a model of power distribution wherein power instead of being concentrated, is dispersed amongst various interest and sectional groups. Accordingly, various groups such as industrialists, workers, traders, cultural and educational groups, religious groups and consumers wield power within their respective realms. Unlike the Elite model or the Marxian Class model which divide power distribution in dichotomous ruling or dominant and ruled or dependent categories, the Pluralist model considers a multidimensional distribution of power. In fact, the pluralist model redefined the liberal democratic political process as continuous competition amongst a variety of groups. The following general features of pluralist model may be noted:

• Industrial society is composed of a variety of social and sectional groups and they have their respective organized interests.
• They are independent of each other in society and press for their interests, compete, negotiate and reconcile.
• Political power is widely distributed amongst these competing groups in liberal–capitalist industrial societies.
• Political process is seen as competition amongst these competing groups for decision-making, resource allocation and favourable power distribution.
• Politics is a ‘business of bargaining and compromise⁵⁸ and negotiation and reconciliation of interests.
• Political decisions are outcomes of negotiation, bargaining and reconciliation amongst this variety of groups.
• Government is seen as composed of two or more political parties, competing for electoral support and elections are seen as a competition amongst political parties. Political parties appeal to a wider audience and interests than sectional and social groups. As a result, the resultant government is seen as representing a wider, compromised and balanced interest of society. In short, the government is seen as an arbiter, mediator and ‘honest broker’, which coordinates and compromises between the demands of various groups. It works as a balancer of conflicting interests and demands. The political process is seen as conflict resolution, negotiation and compromise.
• The pluralist perspective views power distribution in liberal democracies on a multi-dimension scale. Power is not seen as concentrated in the hands of either a class, or elite or dominant group but shared amongst competing groups. Though there is difference of opinion as to whether power of one balances that of the other, balance of power between groups, or some are more powerful than others. John Kenneth Galbraith (the same author when he was American Ambassador to India, 1960s has termed Indian democracy as ‘functioning anarchy’) in his American Capitalism holds that there is dynamic equilibrium amongst competing groups as there is balance of power. Robert Dahl who has given the theory of Polyarchy (democratic government that takes into account interests of many groups in society compulsorily) in his book Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy holds contrary view. For him, there are groups, which ‘are more equal than others’.⁵⁹

The pluralist model of power distribution finds its base in the works of Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government and David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, which furthered the thesis of group politics and located the political process in the interest and conflict of various groups. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, argued that democracy is about competing elites and election is not an exercise of peoples’ power, rather a means for selecting from amongst the competing elite groups. It assumes that there is competition amongst various elite groups. Robert Dahl has studied pluralism in his Who Governs? and Modern Political Analysis and proposes a theory of polyarchy as a pluralist form of democracy. Arnold M. Rose in his The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society followed Dahl’s approach of multiple sources of power and influence. Both Dahl and Rose reject C. Wright Mills thesis of power elite and maintain a ‘multi-influence hypothesis’ where power is dispersed.

Before we discuss the pluralist model of power distribution, let us distinguish for the purpose of clarity, political pluralism of Gierke-Maitland and Laski, MacIver and Barker and group theory of Arthur Bentley and Truman from that of Dahl and Rose. Allan Ball calls the pluralist model as modern pluralism. Gierke-Maitland’s thesis of associations, which was further taken up by Lindsay, Laski, MacIver, Barker, Follett and Figgis, is based on the consideration of independent associations in society and demand for recognition of their prior and independent status vis-à-vis the state. Here the state as an institution is posed as amongst one of such institutions and it is demanded that the power of the state should not be overriding in society. Political pluralism is a demand for a pluralist state where state is one of the associations. Study of Bentley and Truman is from the perspective of pressure and interest groups, which are informal institutions but influence the political process. Pressure and interest groups in society are treated as the pivot of political action because their behaviour determines the political process. Politics is understood in terms of group conflict and interest of groups as the basis of this conflict and political behaviour. The government is treated as ‘adjuster of group conflict’. The pluralist model of power distribution of Dahl and Rose is in continuity with the assumptions of Bentley, Truman and group theorists. However, unlike political pluralism it does not make groups compete with the state, rather they compete amongst themselves to influence the state in resource allocation and decision-making. Unlike political pluralism, Modern pluralism and group theorists are not concerned with juristic and corporate personality of groups and associations but their competition and influence on decision-making in the political process. While political pluralism wants the state compete with other associations for a citizen’s loyalty and obligation, modern pluralism wants the various competing groups operate through representative political parties and formations to influence the decision-making. Reconciliation and moderation of various interests are done by multiple political parties and parties which succeed in projecting as the great reconciler wins. Parties cannot simply be a carrier of sectional interests because to be elected to power requires multi-section support. We are dealing with modern pluralism as a model of distribution of power.

Dahl’s study of local politics in New Haven, Connecticut (USA), Who Governs? is to explore how decision-making is done. Dahl feels that only by examining actual decisions one can find out the distribution of power. His hypothesis was to check whether a single group monopolizes decision- making in community affaires. Alternatively, whether different groups exercise power based on their respective power realm and issue areas. Dahl concludes that: (i) there is widespread dispersal of power among various interest groups; (ii) these groups compete and negotiate as per their issue areas (nomination for political offices, teacher’s salaries, city development, etc.); (iii) these groups do not form a unified group with a common interest as Wright Mills power elite hypothesis suggests; and (iv) there is no overlap of personnel amongst different groups. As a result, Dahl rejects Mills conclusion of power elite and suggests that ‘local politics is business of bargaining and compromise without any group dominating the decision-making’.

Based on his conclusions and observations, Dahl suggested a model of democracy where various groups participate in decision-making. He calls this polyarchy. Polyarchy refers to a model of democratic decision-making where multiple groups participate in decision-making without anyone of them dominating. Dahl accepts that there is no equality of participation by all groups but he assures us against a single elite group that dominates. He also refutes the thesis that a combination of power elite groups can dominate. Dahl examined the relative power of three groups – politicians, economic notables and social notables, as respective dominating groups. He found that none of the three groups dominated. Dahl’s polyarchy bears all the characteristics of a modern representative democracy⁶⁰ such as universal suffrage, free and fair elections, freedom to hold political office or the right to criticize and protest, elected government as representative of the people, relative independent groups and associations and alternative sources of information. One important implication of polyarchy model is that minority groups also get a wide range of chances to participate and influence decision-making. In classic–liberal majority model, minority is at the receiving end. On the other hand, compared to the elite model where minority dominates, in polyarchy the minority (e.g. elites, politicians) cannot dominate for long as they would be required to, dependent on the majority for being selected to the public offices.

Arnold M. Rose’s The Power Structure reflects Dahl’s conclusions on power distribution. He studied the policies of the National Associations of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce, the two bodies that represent the economic elite. Rose proceeds to examine whether political and economic elites work together so as to produce the effect of a single ruling elite’ or power elite as Mills argues. He concludes that plurality of elites, relatively small, are operating in different spheres. He identifies several influencing centres such as economic, political, military, associational, religious and others. Leading from such conclusions, Rose proposes a ‘multi-influence hypothesis’⁶¹ where a variety of influences go into decision-making instead of dominance of any single group.

Dahl and Rose reach more or less the same conclusion and suggest pluralism as the basis of power distribution. However, while Dahl does not hint at elite within the respective groups, Rose tends to hold that there is pluralism as plurality of elites who are competing. In any case, it is apparent that decision-making even if based on plural participation, necessarily requires representation by a few from the respective groups for ease of coordination, gathering and decision- making. Rose sounds like Schumpeter who talks of decision-making amongst competing elites. Rose’s pluralism suggests elite pluralism.

Pluralism provides an important model of power distribution. It relies on decision-making as one of the empirical methods to examine power distribution. Unlike the elite model, the pluralist model does not challenge the liberal democratic assumption except focusing on people as organized groups and associations. Dahl’s polyarchy appears as a modern representative liberal democracy plus concern for group dynamics in the political process. Based on empirical examinations, pluralism contests any hypothesis or suggestion of concentration of power in the liberal–capitalist industrial society. Marx’s class power based on economic dominance or Mills power elite based on a trio of power centres is refuted by pluralism. However, the pluralist theory has been criticized by many writers.

Pluralism has been attacked for being selective in its decision-making methodology. It is argued that decision-making methodology of examining power distribution fails to see why a particular issue has reached the stage of decision-making and why certain others have been excluded without consideration. It is possible that certain issues do not at all reach the level of decision-making and are excluded by the dominant elite. Related to this is the second apprehension. It is possible that there is elite formation within the respective groups. After all, what is the scope of a democratic decision-making and deciding issue areas democratically within a group? Thirdly, though separately, there are plural interests, some of these can combine to produce concentration of power in the form of dominant classes, power elite, etc. Besides, there is a difference of opinion within the pluralist fold on two issues. Firstly, are all groups in equal competition amongst themselves when negotiation, bargaining and decision-making take place? Galbraith has suggested there is balance of power and equality amongst the groups but Dahl differs and holds that there may not be equality of decision-making. Secondly, whether the state is a neutral mediator or it has an interest of its own? Does the state only mediate and honestly brokers amongst competing plurality of the group or does it protect and further its own interests?

The pluralist approach has provided some inputs to the study of distribution of power in socialist countries such as erstwhile USSR, Eastern Europe and China.⁶² Analysts and observers such as J. Hough (‘The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism’ in Problems of Communism, March–April 1972)) and D. Hammer (USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy) had observed that due to emergence of an industrial society various interests and functional groups appear. The dominant party needed to share and accommodate their demand. It has been termed as ‘bureaucratic or institutional pluralism’.