Liberal-Egalitarian Perspective on Justice

John Rawls and Justice as Distribution

It has been argued that due to behavioural and positivist emphasis on value-neutral and fact-based political theory, normative content of political theory has declined. In other words, it was felt that in the mid-twentieth century, there was less emphasis on the normative principle in political theory. This could be due to the elite theory criticizing the traditional understanding of democracy, behavioural rejection of ‘value based’ political theory, empirical model focusing on the political system as a mechanics instead of the state as a politico-social institution, etc. While empirical and positivist direction in political theory was visible, John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) brought to the fore the normative content of political theory afresh. A professor of philosophy at Harvard University, Rawls argued for distributive justice and just distribution of primary goods in society. He argues that the Utilitarian conception of justice as ‘the greatest net balance of satisfactions’ is inadequate and offers contract based theory of justice that takes into account original position (state of nature), individual rationality and decision-making (social contract) into account. Before we discuss Rawls,s concept and principle of justice, let us summarize what it implies:

• Rawls combines liberal (liberty) and egalitarian (equality) arguments to present his concept of distributive justice, which he calls ‘justice as fairness’.²⁹
• Rawls proposes that justice as fairness means certain principles which if followed would result in just distributive arrangements in society. This would be just because the procedure of distribution being followed is based on just principles.
• How do these principles work? For Rawls, principles of liberty and equality should be coordinated as basis to determine distribution of ‘primary goods’ or resources in society. These primary goods include basic liberties, rights, income, wealth, opportunities, offices, welfare.³⁰ How does one get the just principles? He assumes a situation of ‘original position’ (like the state of nature of the social contract as a purely hypothetical and not a historical situation) in which human beings decide the principle of distribution. It is based on social contract assumptions.
• Why this is an original position? This is because the individuals (the decision-makers) are not aware of their class position, social status, intelligence, strength or skills and even the principle of good.
• In such a situation, principles of justice are chosen behind what Rawls calls, the ‘veil of ignorance’.
• Now, what Rawls has constructed is an original state of nature-like position in which individuals are not influenced by their ‘special psychological propensities’ or the idea of good or such differences as class, social and status distinctions or share in natural assets and abilities, intelligence, strength or merit. As such, everyone would work behind the veil of ignorance. He assumes that the individuals being rational decision-makers would make rational choices and devise principles which if followed would result in just distribution in society.
• If this is the situation, Rawls assumes that each individual would choose two principles: (i) equality in assigning basic rights and duties to all; and (ii) social and economic inequalities (of wealth and authority) are arranged in such a way that it results in compensating benefits for everyone and most of all, to the least advantaged.
• Based on these assumptions, Rawls constructs two basic principles of justice as fairness:
  1. First principle: ‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.’
  2. Second principle: ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’.³¹

These are the two basic principles of fairness that Rawls proposes, which would result in justice if they were followed for distributive arrangement in society. The first principle can be called equality principle and the second as difference principle. While the equality principle is ‘concerned with citizens’ equal rights to basic liberties such as the right to vote, freedom of conscience, and so on’ the difference principle ‘is concerned with redistribution’³². To agree with Heywood, while the first principle proposed by Rawls reflects some kind of ‘traditional liberal commitment to formal equality’ the second ‘points towards a significant measure of social equality’. It appears that the equality principle gives priority to equal liberty for all; the difference principle involves two criteria that would determine the iniquitous distribution of material and economic rewards in society. Within the difference principle, the first criteria relates to material inequality when it makes everyone better off and works in favour of the least advantaged. This means that reward could be related to talent, merit and skills or abilities of individuals if and only if it works for the betterment of the least advantaged. Further, the second criteria within the difference principle implies equality of opportunity that allows talents and merits to compete but also includes a level playing field to compensate for initial distortion. Rawls’s presumptions are in favour of equality and argue for inequality to the extent it does not distort the basic redistributionist principle. Thus, for Rawls, the basic criteria of distribution is not individual talent or merit or ability or deserts but needs for equal distribution of primary goods and the greatest benefit to the least advantaged through just outcomes. Why does Rawls feel that skills, talents or merits of individuals cannot be the basis of fair distribution?

Rawls’s position is based on his criticism of negative or ‘natural’ liberty. Rawls feel that according to the negative system of liberty, positions are open to those who are able and willing to use their skill and talents in whatever way they choose. Here, personal negative liberty has priority and resultant outcome is considered just. Therefore, how people earn wealth or reward become important and not what wealth or reward they earn. According to Rawls, as Walton explains, in terms of negative liberty, ‘the distribution is just so long as it is acquired under conditions where people are (negatively) free to use their skills and talents …’³³ Apparently, justness is a function of initial liberty in the negative sense and not of outcome. Rawls disagrees from the proposal that rewards should be in proportion to skills and talents. Rawls argues that skills and talent, to a large extent, are result of ‘naturally and socially acquired advantages’. These are contingently acquired talents. This means talents and merits are not possessions of individuals per se as negative liberalism holds but result of either natural endowment or fortunate family and social circumstances. The moot question, which Rawls raises, is that: should individual rewards or material benefits be allocated primarily based on contingently acquired talent or merits possessed by individuals?

Rawls treats these talent, merits, skills and abilities as common assets, which ought to be distributed on just principles. This means, talents and merits or skills themselves cannot be a basis of just distribution but would require a publicly related principle of distribution, which treats distribution of talents or merits of abilities as common assets. Rawls’s argument against desert as the basis of distribution is that it is arbitrary to reward a person for contingently acquired skills and capacities derived from a social and natural advantageous position say, class or social positions. As an alternative, Rawls constructs the principle of justice that gives priority to needs than desert or entitlement based on talents or skills.