Liberty, Equality and Fraternity
Ernest Barker in his book, Principles of Social and Political Theory has discussed the relationship ‘between liberty, equality and fraternity or cooperation’. He treats these values as important and states that they are ‘recognised by organized system of human relations’ though they are present in at different times and different systems in different degrees. He further suggests that there is a need for ‘constant process of adjustment and readjustment between the overriding claims of different values’. For example, the claim of equality has to be adjusted with liberty and vice-versa (i.e., regulated and relative liberty) and claims of both have to be adjusted to fraternity or cooperation. Liberty means freedom of individual to exercise one’s own capacity for development of personality. Rights are secured conditions for greatest possible development of these capacities. Fraternity is the principle of distribution of rights amongst all for common enjoyment. It implies cooperation or solidarity in sharing common means and enjoyment. We can depict Barker’s description as seen in Figure 10.2.
Figure 10.2 Barker’s Description of Adjustment between Values
If this is the relationship between liberty, equality and fraternity, then how does principle of justice fit in here? Barker states that justice traces its roots from ‘jus’ or ‘justus’ (both Latin) and contains the idea of ‘fitting or joining’. Fitting or joining implies bond or tie between man and man. However, Barker is of the view that this can be also applied between values and values. The fitting or joining of values—liberty, equality and fraternity, is synthesis of values. But how is this synthesis secured, or which principle helps us secure this synthesis where liberty is regulated in favour of equality and becomes relative to liberty of each, and fraternity and equality are adjusted to liberty? The function must require a principle or value that secures this synthesis. Barker suggests that function of justice is synthesis of liberty, equality and fraternity. Justice does joining or fitting between different values and adjusts and reconciles them with each other. Justice as such is a reconciler and synthesizer of political values—liberty, equality and fraternity. In other words, justice is ‘the union and adjusted whole of all political values which are staking claim for recognition.’ Justice, according to Barker, reconciles and regulates the general distribution of rights. It helps give each person his/her share of rights and adjust person to person. Justice is a balancer, adjuster, reconciler and synthesizer of values. It goes beyond liberty, equality and fraternity and balances each of them.
Barker’s analysis of the relationship between liberty, equality and justice provides a case for reconciling claims of different political values so that equal conditions for the development of personality of all could be secured. Justice becomes a principle or value that helps adjust and reconcile the claim of liberty (as in liberal view) and equality both legal (in liberal view) and economic (socialist and positive liberal view). Examples of the three values—liberty, equality and fraternity—invoked together are found in the thought of Stoics and the French Declaration. Stoics led by Zeno, about whom we have briefly discussed above, argued in favour of natural law and universal order based on right reason and rational order. Concluding from the rational order they believed that men are rational in nature and as such they should be regarded ‘free and self-governing’ (liberty); being all rational in nature should be regarded as equal in status (equality); and men united with each other by a common factor of reason are linked together in solidarity (fraternity). Barker feels that Stoics reconciled the three principles. We also find that the three principles have been invoked in the French Declaration and in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution along with justice.
Historically, the idea of liberty and legal equality emerged together during the eighteenth century. However, liberalism was not ready to adjust liberty with demand of social and economic equality raised subsequently. Positive liberalism of Mill, Green Tawney, Hobhouse and others, and socialist thought, particularly the Marxian perspective argued that social and economic equality must be realized for justice to be meaningful. The concept of justice and its relationship with equality provides a basis of distributive justice. Aristotle was the earliest thinker to relate justice with treatment of equal as equal and unequal as unequal in terms of distribution of public offices, wealth and privileges in Greek city-state. However, he justified the slavery even though he advocated distributive justice. Bentham’s doctrine of one to count as one in determining utility provides the basis for equal treatment. Argument of the analytical school for legal equality becomes the basis for legal justice. Principle of distributive justice has been discussed and advocated by Rawls in egalitarian perspective and by Nozick in libertarian perspective. In India, B. R. Ambedkar has forcefully put forward the need for social equality as the basis of justice. We will discuss the ideas of Ambedkar, Rawls and Nozick below. If justice is related to equality, which it is, then it should seek equality in all in its dimensions—legal, social, political and economic. Though in Europe, legal and political equality was initially achieved it was confined to men only. While social and economic equality still needs to be realized, even legal and political equality for women are lacking in many countries. If justice is synthesis between political values, it must truly reconcile not only liberty and equality, but also their various dimensions.
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