Elitist Perspective on Distribution of Power

The elitist perspective on distribution of power recognizes diversification of power amongst a variety of intelligent, qualified, skilled, meritorious and distinguished persons. These people belong to different aspects of life—political, social, economic, religious, spiritual, educational, intelligentsia, etc. It maintains that power is diversified and distributed amongst those who are of exceptional qualities, intelligence and skill. Before we survey the views of elitist theorists—Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Schumpeter, Dahl, Wright Mills and others, it may be helpful to summarize the basic assumptions of the elitist view on distribution of power. According to elitist view:

• Society is divided into two groups—superior people by virtue of their qualities or social background and those who are masses.
• The superior people are rulers or those who govern and massed are subjected to rule or are governed.
• Rule by the elite minority is inevitable in all societies and there can be only one form of government, i.e., rule by the elite.
• Personal qualities such as intelligence, ability, aptitude, meritorious and distinguished qualifications, special skills, make some superior than others. Social background and organizing skills are an added advantage. Those with exceptional personal qualities are rulers and those deprived, ruled.
• Power distribution in society is diversified amongst the political elites in different fields who are rulers.
• Elites are small in number, enjoy power and privileges and direct and rule over others. They are a dominant group in society and their dominance is not attributable to economic power only, but personal competence, aptitude, ability, intelligence, talent and merit.
• Political elites are cohesive, united and closed and they prevail in all political systems. This means that political elites are present in all political systems.

However, despite initial emphasis on personal qualities as important attributes for elites, later elite theorists insist on institutional frameworks of society that allow minority to monopolize power.³⁵ For example, Wright Mill’s emphasis on power elite belonging to certain institutions, or dominance of certain castes in India under the caste system can be cited as examples of institutional arrangement that catapult elites. It may be noted that the elite theory was a reaction against the Marxian theory of singular source of power—economic class. Elite theorists hold that multiple sources of power make elite. There is no agreement amongst elite theorists about the source of power, whether it is economic, political, social, psychological, such as the will to power or the ability to organize.³⁶

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, three sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941) both Italian and a German, Robert Michels (1876–1936) propounded the elite theory of power distribution and dominance. Subsequently, J. A. Schumpeter, Ortega Gasset, Giovanni Sartori, Karl Mannheim, Robert Dahl, C. Wright Mills and others have analysed power distribution from the elite perspective. These are analysis of capitalist democratic societies of the West, which are considered as a universally applicable dictum. Theorists and political sociologists such as Raymond Aron, Milovan Djilas and David Lane, who have observed the dynamics of the communist societies, have analysed the phenomenon of the elite class in these societies.³⁷ Some of the analysts and political theorists such as Hamza Alavi (on Pakistan) and Pranab Bardhan (on India) have analysed the phenomenon of dominance of a minority and concentration of all power in their hands and dominant proprietary class influencing government’s policies and resource distribution.

Pareto’s The Mind and Society spells out the classical statement of the elitist theory. He used the term ‘elite’ to denote a social group that possess superior qualities and influence over others in society. It holds that elites are products not of economic dominance, as Marx would have said, but of human attributes. The superiority in intelligence, talent, skill, ability, character, capacity, will power, etc. result in elite formation. One of the peculiar elements of Pareto’s theory is that superior human ability can be found in any activity or field including theft and prostitution on the one hand and law and medicine on the other. According to Pareto, elites can be found in any field. It may be added that Pareto does not evaluate the phenomenon of elites as per moral or ethical yardstick but as per achievement. A great train robbery and a successful medical surgery are the same things from the point of view of achievements of the doer—robbery for the thief and surgery for the doctor. Apparently, for Pareto only those who acquire the highest achievement in their respective activities are elites irrespective of the field of activity.

Pareto puts special emphasis on the psychological quality and characteristics as the basis of elites. Having accepted psychological superiority and criteria of achievement as the basis of elites, Pareto differentiates between elite and non-elites or the masses. Elites are the superior people who govern. This governing superiority also comes from two basic psychological qualities—qualities of a lion and of a fox. A lion’s qualities are identified as courage, direct and incisive action and force, while a fox is identified with cunning, guile and manipulation. Military dictatorship could be identified with qualities of lion and democracies with qualities of foxes. We may recall that Machiavelli in his The Prince had suggested his king to combine the qualities of both lion and fox to be successful. Within the category of elites, Pareto further differentiates between governing and non-governing elites. Governing elites are those who exercise power due to their position of lion or fox. Non-governing elites are those who though they have qualities but not in the same capacity as the governing. However, non-governing elites are in constant effort to exceed in ability and quality and replace the governing elites. Since all elites become decadent, lose their vigour and ability, e.g., lion losing imagination and fox losing incisive action, those who come with these qualities replace the governing elite. This constant replacement is, what Pareto calls ‘circulation of elites’. Within the elites, there is constant circulation of elites, from governing to non-governing and vice-versa. Social change is confined within the scope of the circulation of elite.

Paretos elite theory is a theory of constant circulation but no change, theory of constant inequality but no struggle and revolution. Within elites, new persons are recruited and replaced but it does not lead to any social change. History, for Pareto, is nothing but a ‘graveyard of aristocracies’, one set govern, another decay. Pareto’s theory seems quite odd for a democratic notion of people’s power but governing leaders as well as the opposition leaders are part of elites. Only those who oppose the regime are outside the elite-fold. Pareto’s elite theory goes against the Marxian notion of economic and class dominance and democratic notion of people’s power. However, it is not clear whether Pareto allows enough room for circulation of elites from non-elite category. We have circulation between governing and non-governing elites or between the lions and the foxes. Does this mean there is no scope of recruitment from the masses? Masses are always lacking in elite qualities, so how can there be recruitment from this category? Pareto however, cautions that if elite is closed from recruitment from below, it loses vitality and its life will be short. Pareto’s caution gets a challenge in the form of contrary historical instances. As pointed out by sociologist, T. B. Bottomore Elites and Society, The Brahman caste in India despite being a closed group in terms of recruitment from below, survived for centuries.³⁸ However, this is possible when the major source of elite competition, i.e., acquisition of knowledge is restricted within this caste and others are excluded. This is almost like the TINA (There Is No Alternative) factor. Similar to the electoral victory of some parties, which owes to absence of any credible alternative, the Brahman caste survived by excluding possibility of any group acquiring credible knowledge as an alternative. In fact, Frankel has pointed out that during the British period when education and employment opportunities came up, ‘initially educated classes were drawn primarily from among Brahmans and other upper castes having literate tradition’.³⁹ This is an example of horizontal shift from caste-based knowledge group to modern-based knowledge group. It may be noted that what Frankel mentions as ‘other upper castes’ may refer to the Kayastha caste (similar to the scribes) whose origin is traced during the medieval period. Primarily, the Brahman caste has been the custodian of knowledge, initially scriptural, speculative, yogic and of conduct and subsequently, professional and statecraft.

Another elite theorist, Gaetano Mosca also upheld the basic elitist assumption that rule by a minority is an inevitable feature in society. In his, The Ruling Class, Mosca wrote ‘in all societies … two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The former, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first …’⁴⁰ If these are the conclusions that Mosca draws, then what is the reason that one monopolizes power and the other submits to it. Is it some sort of superiority enjoyed by the ruling class that helps it subordinate others? Mosca suggests that there are certain qualities related to background that help the ruling class gain their position. Unlike Pareto, who believed that elite qualities are universal, unchangeable and the same for all the time, Mosca suggested that it varies according to societies and time. Accordingly, the composition of elite also changes.

For Pareto, there are governing and non-governing elites, on the one hand and masses on the other. For Mosca, there are ruling and ruled classes. Minority always constitutes the ruling class and majority the ruled. While classical liberal democratic tradition considers majority as the governing doctrine, Mosca honours minority as the ruling class. However, numerical minority is not in any way deficient because the basis of superiority for the minority comes from qualities, which match with social requirements. These may vary from society to society. For example, a society may value bravery or courage while another values capacity and skill. Thus, those who excel in these will acquire the elite position. Pareto maintains that qualities that the elite possess or display are un-changeable and same for all the time. Mosca, on the other hand, mentions that the elite-forming qualities depend on social recognition and vary from society to society.

His theory refutes Aristotle’s sixfold classification of constitutions because for Mosca, there can be only one form of constitution, that is oligarchy. Mosca and Pareto, both refute any possibility people or majority as the basis of democracy that classical liberal democracy espouses, cherishes and celebrates. This excludes the possibility of ‘government by the people’, as government can be only by the elite. As Haralambos maintains, ‘Mosca regretted extension of franchise to all members of the society believing it should be limited to the middle class’. Pareto considers personal attributes such as talent, intelligence and merit as the basis for elite formation and superior power. However, Mosca in addition to personal intelligence, will power and capacity, regards social background as an important element in elite formation and power distribution. While Pareto’s is a theory based on psychological and personal criteria, Mosca combines both psychological and sociological criteria. In addition, Mosca treats the organizing power of the elite as against the unorganized majority as an important factor in elite formation. Organized minority versus unorganized majority will always prevail by using its compactness, organizational skill and common purpose.

Mosca also maintained that the political elite tends to become hereditary. Seeking a parallel to the Newton’s theory of inertia whereby a thing (a matter) remains moving or static until an opposite force is applied, he suggests that the political elite has a tendency to stabilize and sustain. Mosca pointed out this phenomenon happening in English, French and Italian Parliaments where hereditary occupants of the political offices were common. Seen in this perspective, one can say that elections are, at times or may be always, nothing but a chance to choose between those contesting for political inheritance. Mosca was certainly aware of the hereditary castes in India,⁴¹ though he is not alive to celebrate the application of his theory of takeover by hereditary elites in the post-independent political process in India. Presently, we normally find hereditary transfer of power, electoral constituency and other allied political and public offices as one of the decisive factors in acquisition of political office. What we have come to term as dynastic or family rule in India fits in the analysis of Mosca. We have hereditary transfer of political offices within various political parties including the Congress party, Shiva Sena, and Rashtriya Janata Dal of Laloo Prasad Yadav and by a host of leaders promoting their relatives and sons/daughters/wives as their inheritors. One would concede that in itself, there is no harm for any individual citizen to take up political activity and public service as his/her occupation and in fact, to argue against is to demolish the very basis of democratic participation. One belonging to a particular family or dynasty and being relayed to a particular political leader, should not be held against him or her for aspiring and holding political offices. How can it be ensured that these are merely coincidental and not by design? One the other hand, it can also be argued that if electorates choose such leaders what is the harm in it. However, such selection also reflects on the nature of the electorate and a doubt arises as to whether the electorate are merely hero-wishers. In the Indian democracy, hereditary transfer of power, electoral constituencies and political and allied offices have been possible due to a variety of factors. Firstly, importance of charismatic leaders belonging to a dynasty or family helps in keeping various factions and interests groups together. This has been very relevant for the Congress party even now. Secondly, lack of party affiliation in citizens and importance of particular leaders leads to personality-cult and hero-worship. It implies that electorates are less affiliated to parties and more to a particular leader and his/her inheritors. Thirdly, there is identification of a particular brand of politics with a family or dynasty, for example, Nehru–Gandhi family as providers of stability, Thakreys as custodians of pride of the Mumbaikars, Laloo Yadav and family as the saviours of downtrodden in Bihar. Fourthly, there is possibility of psychological continuity of feudal and master–subject relationship where general electorates still feel that those who are rulers should continue to be so as if they are endowed with this right.

Mosca also discusses about ‘new middle class’, who includes civil servants, managers, scientists, scholars and treats them as vital elements in society. He terms them as ‘sub-elite’.⁴² Mosca’s sub-elite category is an important segment of the industrial society and in India context will coincide with the middle class. It appears that unlike the classical-liberal assumption of middle class as the basis of a stable government, Mosca does not assign any such role to the sub-elite. For Mosca, elite being the ruling class remain oligarchic and sub-elite at best can play an important role.

Two other theorists, Roberto Michels and Moisei Ostrogorski, focused on oligarchic tendencies in a political organization, particularly in political parties. Ostrogorski in his Democracy and the Organization of the Political Parties had investigated the internal party democracy and concluded that ‘the representation of individual interests had lost out to the growing influence of the party machine and control exerted by a caucus of senior party figures.’⁴³ This fear of absence of internal party democracy not being conducive to representative democracy was famously analysed by Michels. In his study, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, he analysed the inner dynamics of decisionmaking and power distribution of European Socialist Parties and trade unions with particular emphasis on the German Socialist Party.⁴⁴ Both Ostrogorski and Michels were concerned with contradictory tendencies—while democracy requires political parties, they themselves evolve as undemocratically organized organizations. On the one hand, the German Socialist Party had its aim as opposition to the capitalist system and declared itself to be organized on democratic principles, on the other hand, Michels’s analysis revealed that an ‘Iron Law of Oligarchy’ prevails within the organization. Michels suggested that without organization (i.e., political parties or organizations that ensure representation), democracy is inconceivable. However, these very organizations, due to complexity of issues in society and apathetic attitude of masses/electorates, develop a bureaucratic structure and become oligarchic. Michels followed a simple line of argument as follows: Democracy requires organization in the form of parties to represent the masses because vastness and complexity of the society will not allow any other way of democratic participation. Political parties operate through structured organization with the leadership, full-time politicians and officials. Due to division of labour, hierarchy and control, decision-making and resource allocation become confined in the hands of a small group of leaders. This produces rule and control of small elites. Michels calls this Iron Law of Oligarchy, meaning that any organization, political party, bureaucracy, trade union, etc. is bound to degenerate in elite rule. Michels declares, ‘It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over mandators, of delegates over delegates. Who says organization, says oligarchy.’⁴⁵

Oligarchic rule is sustained by leaders through manipulation, oratory and persuasion, reward-distribution, etc. Above all, Michels is concerned about the mass mind (apathetic, slavish, ready to be led), which helps in the growth of oligarchic tendencies. Michels portrays the common masses as ‘apathetic, indolent, and slavish and are permanently incapable of self-government’.⁴⁶ This further allows the manipulative and skilful leaders to hoodwink the masses. Oligarchic tendencies and mass mind are worrying elements for Michels because he treats these as enemies of liberty. Michels’s idea of mass mind is relevant in the context of masses generally following the personality-cult and hero-worship. Elite theorists believe that masses need to be led and oligarchic tendencies are further supported by this need where a few leaders acquire full power.

We have talked about the hero worship, personality cult and charismatic leadership phenomenon in the Indian context. All parties are more or less susceptible to Michels’s formulation in Indian democracy also. What does Party High Command mean in the Indian context? Is it the ‘bureaucratic pyramid’ that Michels was worried about? Despite some of the left and the right parties, having rigid cadre- based social affiliations, invariably all political parties in India are organized bureaucratically and have ‘top leaders’ with whom they are identified with. While the left parties are organized on Lenin’s principle of ‘democratic centralism’ with Politbureau as the decision-making and controlling centre over a wide network of cadres and trade union affiliations, the right partied are also cadre-based, with High Command as the central directing agency. The centrist Congress party is known for its high command directions over regionally affiliated units (State Units). Michels’s conclusion that in democracy, political parties establish a bureaucratic pyramid and central leadership seems inescapable in India too. However, though the general tendency of bureaucratic centralism, oligarchic leadership is evident, there are certain socially generated factors that work as checks on this tendency. Caste affiliations of many leaders make them behave in factional interest. At the level of top leadership, factionalism restricts emergence of any rigid oligarchic tendency. Generally, Michels oligarchic rule is faced with factional pulls and pressures.

In Britain, study of Robert McKenzie, British Political Parties, ‘concluded that the distribution of power within the two parties (the Conservative Party and the Labour Party) was essentially the same: both were dominated by a nexus of parliamentary leaders’.⁴⁷ McKenzie’s conclusion was contrary to the generally held view that the Conservative party was more elitist than the Labour Party, which has internal democracy.

Pareto, Mosca and Michels presented what is called classical position on elite theory. Elite model has been applied by many writers in their study of the power structure in capitalist, socialist and developing countries. McKenzie’s study of the Conservative and the Labour parties in England, C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter’s study of the power elite in America, Raymond Aron, Milovan Djilas and David Lane in socialist countries, Pranab Bardhan in India and Hamza Alavi in Pakistan have attempted to understand power structure of these societies. Writers such as J. A. Schumpeter, Giovanni Sartori, Anthony Downs, Robert Dahl, Harold Lasswell and others have used the premises of the elite theory such as, minority rule, mass apathy, manufactured public opinion and election as competition between elites, to discredit the premise of majority-based liberal democracy and argue for the elitist model of democracy. The elite model provoked debate and as a result modern political theory is not wholly reconciled to the Lincolnian position that democracy is ‘of the people, by the people and for the people’.

Pareto and Mosca focused on the psychological and personal aspects of individuals as the the basis of elite formation and recruitment, though Mosca also took into account the social background. Ostrogorski, Michels and McKenzie have discussed about the organizational basis of elite formation or elite tendencies found in political parties, bureaucracies, trade unions and similar other organizations. This means democracy implies inevitability of organizations and the later invariably leads to dominance of elite. Mills and Hunter have analysed power distribution by applying the institutional basis. It means that there are certain institutions which have such a structure that anyone at the top of it would monopolize power. These institutions are hierarchically organized, wield power either economic or political, and their occupants have interconnected interests and activities. Mills identified three such institutions, the major corporations, the military and the federal government. While the major corporations are repository of economic power, the military wields enormous power in terms of national defence as well as defence trade, and both these influence political power. A federal government has political power, which is concerned with military and economic activity. Thus, we have three pivots of power—economic elite, military elite and political elite. Since, these three groups of elite have similar interests and activities, their coincidence forms, what Mills calls, ‘power elite’ in USA. These are the conclusions which Mills’s The Power Elite presents.

In addition to coincidence as power elite, Mill suggests that they share cultural and psychological orientations and their social origin. Their shared interests, activities and interconnected-ness manifest in each serving the other. Mills declares that ‘American capitalism is now in considerable part military capitalism.’⁴⁸ This means when corporations manufacture military and defence equipments, both economic and military interests are served. To serve these interests, war must go on, national defence must always be in threat and there must always be an enemy to fight and if there is none, one must always be created. Similarly, the government’s decision generally favours economic interests of big corporations. Mills’s contention is that the power elite has similarity of interests. This similarity of interests is further solidified because of similarity in their social background. Empirically, Mills’s finding is that the social origin reveals their background from the upper strata, mainly Protestants, native-born American and from urban areas in eastern USA. They share similar educational backgrounds, cultural and recreational gatherings and as a result inculcate similar values, attitudes, tastes and outlook. This further provides scope of interchange amongst the three elites. The political elite has been, or would be, a military or economic elite and vice versa.

Coincidence of economic, military and political power gives rise to the power elite and similarity in their social origin makes them cohesive and unified. They have overlapping personnel, and frequent interchange takes place. What implication does it have? Two direct implications can be noted. Firstly, emergence of power elite means concentration of power in a few hands and that too without they being accountable through formal channels to the people. Secondly, influence and dominance of these elites affects political decision-making and to that extent politics as a means of conflict resolution and reconciliation of interests is replaced by an extra-political mechanism of the power elite. He even hints that the decision of bombing Hiroshima during the Second World War was in fact decision of the power elite without any involvement of the people.

Robert Dahl has generally been critical of the elite theory and its assumptions because it focuses on those who have power and then concludes that those who have power are elites. Further, Dahl uses his polyarchical argument to present that power in one dimension may not result in power in another. For example, one who is economically powerful may not be so powerful politically. He criticizes Mills for treating potential for power equivalent to actual control. Actual control can exist when there is continuity in their control and that they control covers all areas of decision-making. The elite theory is also attacked due to lack of any explanation or possibility on social change.

However, Mills’s study at the federal level was evidenced by another study at the regional level. Community Power Structure investigated distribution of power at the local and regional levels in the states of the USA. He concluded that the small economic elite control and influence decision-making. They also control media and through them influence public opinion. and policy-making. It is said that since Hunter focused only on economic elite, he could not figure out the power of other groups.

While three different dimensions—personal and psychological, organizational and institutional, of elite formation and recruitment has been discussed above, some of the theorists have argued that elite formation is applicable across societies irrespective of economic set-up, particularly capitalist and socialist. James Burnham in his The Managerial Revolution maintains that a small group of managerial elite will control society economically and politically. His argument is that unlike what Marx predicted, capitalists do not own and control the means of production, rather ownership and management has been separated. A small managerial group directs and manages the means of production in the capitalist society. Sounding like Marx, Burnham holds that it is the control over means of production and distribution that is the basis of elite power. However, his similarity stops here and unlike Marx, he concludes that capitalists are not the owners of the means of production and distribution because they have been separated from actual operation. The managerial elite controls and directs the operation. Burnham’s logic applies equally well to socialist societies where managers are required to operate state-owned production. If the managerial elite controls production and distribution, in socialist societies also they will emerge.

Aron, Lane and Djilas have done analysis of elite rule in socialist societies. Following the convergence argument, types and nature of societies are treated as influenced by industrial compulsion irrespective of being capitalist or socialist. Aron argues that power distribution in socialist and capitalist societies will follow the same pattern as political, economic and military power in a socialist society have also been concentrated in the same hands. If Mills’s observation applies to concentration of power in a capitalist society, Aron’s observation applies to a socialist society. Mills elite model more appropriately applies to the cohesive and unified power the elite concentrated in the socialist state. Milovan Djilas, Yugoslavian writer has pointed out that a communist party constitutes a ruling minority and it seeks self- interests. Djilas terms a group of privileged party leaders as a ‘new class’, which coincides with the elite status. David Lane has opposed Djilas’s contention that the ruling elite work for self-interest and has argued that it aimed at industrialization and economic development.

Hamza Alavi has done an analysis of power distribution in Pakistan. He draws a general conclusion that a minority of the whole population dominates in landownership, business, representation in politics, bureaucracy, profession, military and government. Similar to the conclusion Mills draws in the American case, these elite members in civil and military bureaucracy, profession, government and business share their social origin and also their cultural and attitudinal orientation. Normally, many writers seek to relate the periodic failure of democratic institutions in Pakistan to a presumed limitation of Islamic tenets to be compatible with liberal democracy. However, one can argue that this is more a function of concentration of worldly powers than anything to do with religious tenets. Concentration of power due to coincidence of the interests of civil–military–business–landed-political elite in Pakistan may be a cause of democratic failure. Three visible orientations can be located in Pakistan—concentration of power at the elite level, military bureaucracy as the main regime type with a brief democratic lullaby, and mixing of military, elite and Islamic interests to further and perpetuate military rule.

The elite model, no doubt, is useful in understanding how power distribution gets concentrated in the hands of a few elite. The relevance of this model lays in its applicability across political systems, capitalist, socialist and developing countries. However, due to its focus only on those who wield power, the elite model fails to analyse what happens at the societal level. Its limitation in capturing the churnings before elite formation and recruitment makes it a limited model to understand social change. In a developing country where access to education and other means of capacity building and entrepreneurship is limited, rule and circulation of elite in a closed manner may be a possibility. However, recruitment from the non-elite into the elite category provides a major dimension of socio-economic change in society. Mere circulation of elites cannot be a process suitable for all round socio-economic progress of a developing society. For example, the phenomenon of factional and caste base intra-elite rivalry put a limitation on cohesive character of the elite in India. The elite theory alone cannot provide a relevant framework for understanding power structure and process of social change in developing societies.