Critical Evaluation of Pluralist Theory

Our critical evaluation of the pluralist theory may assess it as a critique of the monist theory of sovereignty and as a theory of a pluralist state.

The advocates of the monist doctrine of sovereignty focused on legal functions of the State at the cost of exclusion of social forces, which determine the content and limits of law. Although writers like Bodin and Austin recognized limits on the sovereign, their recognition was more a moral concession than politically constructed restrictions. Bodin puts limitations in terms of law of God and nature (inviolability of private property) and Salic law (exclusion of females from French dynastic rules) and Austin in terms of opinion and sentiments current in the community as limiting legal control of the State. These at best, can be described as amorphous and particularistic limitations which cannot be part of a well constructed limitation on the state so far as individual liberty and group autonomy in society are concerned. Further, Hobbes’s Leviathan cannot even tolerate groups, which he describes as ‘worms in the entrails’ of the body politic. In the hands of some of the idealist writers like Hegel, it is taken to tyrannical implications in political spheres in the cover of moral absolutism of the State—’march of the god on earth’.

Pluralists’ attack on the traditional theory of sovereignty emerges out of this fear and the monistic claim of legal supremacy. On the one hand, this makes the pluralists repudiate the traditional theory of sovereignty and on the other, to supplant it with a vision of pluralist state. We may analyse how successful the pluralist approach has been in this endeavour without forgetting the context in which it emerged and the valuable contributions it made to the political concepts of limited government, political consent and representation, individual and group liberty, authority etc.

Failure of the pluralist approach as critique of traditional/monist concept of sovereignty may be summarized as follows:

• On legal basis, pluralists’ rejection of sovereignty depends on the denial of the idea of legal sovereignty. They deny that law is command of the sovereign and is created by the State. They also reject the idea that state is a legal order with a determinate superior or body of men to sanction and impose its imperatives. Duguit, Krabbe and MacIver seek to locate the origin of law in society—’sense of right’ or ‘condition of social solidarity’ or social customs, traditions and its requirements. By doing so, they are arguing for the contents of law and not merely its formalization. However, though they seek to shift the location and origin of law, they fail to provide an answer to the question: how to decide and formalize what is sense of right or condition of social solidarity and who decides when these give rise to conflict in society? Secondly, they invariably end up conceding to the State or its organ, the right to formalize and give expression to these social requirements or laws.
• For Duguit, the State should, through its action, secure social solidarity, while Krabbe does not deny that there could be organs that issue commands and make decisions obeyed by the bulk of the community in a state. According to MacIver, part of social law, which has origin in society, in turn is reinforced, reaffirmed, and enlarged as the law of the state. This way, despite shifting the location and origin of law from the sovereign to the social platform, the pluralist could not completely challenge the traditional claim that any law to be called law per se requires state’s sanction and must be, what Coker calls, prescribed. Coker opines that ‘law is what the community demands to be attained through the prescription of the state.’⁹² Laski in his Foundations of Sovereignty accepts that there exists a definite organ in the State to which prescription of law can be attributed. He says, ‘legally no one can deny that there exists in every state some organ whose authority is unlimited.’⁹³ Thus, neither legal primacy of the State nor it as a legal order is adequately challenged by pluralists. We have seen previously, how Duguit’s doctrine of law was challenged and denounced by French jurists like Esmein, Hauriou, Malberg and Michoud as ‘legal anarchism. K. C. Hsiao, on the other hand, feels that the principle of social solidarity as the basis of law will substitute ‘a social monism for political absolutism.’⁹⁴
• Suppose we accept that law, to be legitimately enforced, requires its content and essential characteristics to be socially relevant, i.e., based on social practices and prevalent opinion. Even then pluralists cannot escape the contradiction, which springs from state acting against many prevalent social practices that are inhuman, retrograde and exploitative. Lets us take the example of social legislation in India in the field of abolition of untouchability, sati, child marriage, etc. These are practices, which in a historical context have been socially or religiously accepted. If these represent ‘sense of right’ of majority or ‘condition of social solidarity’ or requirement of society, then the Indian state, instead of abolishing them, should have crowned them as law. In short, we can say that the State through its law may achieve exactly the opposite of what the pluralists seek in social basis.
• In the Marxian sense, pluralism by giving primacy to ‘condition of social solidarity’ or ‘sense of right’ as basis of law actually amounts to sanctioning dominant economic relations in society. In some respects, like the law protecting right to private property may be said to have been a reflection of dominant economic relations in a society. In any case, for the Marxian perspective, law in a class-divided society, either in the form of command of the sovereign or condition of social solidarity or sense of right of the majority, is a class instrument and part of an ideological apparatus. Laski, in his Grammar of Politics accepted that ‘the weakness, as now I see, of pluralism is clear enough. It did not sufficiently realize the nature of the state as an expression of class relations’ and further added that ‘if it be the fact … that the State is inevitably the instrument of that class which owns the instruments of production, the objective of the pluralist must be the classless society.’⁹⁵ However, this Marxian position for Laski equally applies in refuting legal order. He says, ‘The legal order is a mask behind which a dominant economic interest secures the benefit of political authority.’⁹⁶
• By posing the doctrine of group personality, pluralists seek not only to recognize existence of diverse groups but also argue for dispersal of power amongst these groups. This dispersal of power, of course, is meant to downsize state sovereignty. Existence of diversity and groups in society has been accepted and cherished in different degrees by a series of political and social thinkers including Aristotle, Durkheim, Syndicalists, Guild Socialists, group theorists like Bentley and Dahl and others. In fact, it was Plato, Hobbes and Hegel who actively derided such groups in society. For Plato and Hegel, it was challenge to organic unity of the State and for Hobbes they were worms in the body politic, a challenge to the Leviathan. In order to refute not only the legal but also the moral sovereignty, the State is placed at par with and in the league with other associations and groups by pluralists. By doing so, they deal with a fundamental issue of political theory, i.e., individual–state anti-thesis. Within the overall framework of liberal theory, pluralism seems to suggest that an individual seeks liberty and development of self as a member of a variety of groups to which his/her affiliations are natural and loyalty deeper. Family, Church, Club and Trade Union, all are expressions of emotional, religious, cultural or recreational and economic or professional requirements. As such, these groups are independent of and prior to state’s sanction. This premise is to challenge the monist concepts that groups persons as collection of individuals can be only a fiction, ‘individual is the only juridical personality’⁹⁷ worth their rights and duties and existence of groups is only a concession of the sovereign authority. This way the concept that sovereign is a grantor of rights and duties to any group in juridical terms is refuted.
• How far are pluralists successful in refuting the sovereignty of the State by posing the doctrine of group personality? First of all, some of the pluralists like Barker do not agree with the ‘real personality’ concept and accept only jurist terms. Secondly, different pluralists argue for different associations. For example, Figgis focused primarily on church. Though pluralists generally argue that loyalties of individuals to groups are deeper and their affiliations more natural, Laski and Follett agree that no one group can encompass all the interests of an individual. It is also generally true that loyalty of an individual cannot be exclusive, as groups do not exist parallel to each other. For example, loyalty to church and trade union at times may be at variation. Given this, how can we accept primacy of any one group? In fact, this would do just the opposite to what pluralists seek. Thirdly, while arguing for decentralization of authority to groups, pluralists, it seems, speak of decentralization of sovereignty. Laski says ‘Sovereignty, in fact, necessarily to be distributed in order that the purpose of men may be achieved.’⁹⁸ It seems sovereignty is not completely abandoned but what Andrew Vincent calls, pluralized. This presents a contradiction in itself. If sovereignty implies supremacy, how can this be possible that at the same time various groups are supreme? Will it not be like declaring all ethnic and linguistic groups as nations though saying that they are part of a nation-state?
• Barker, Lindsay, Follett and Laski accept that groups should be regulated by the State. And this is required in most of the cases to ensure individual liberty from coercion of groups. For example, in case of independence of the church, what guarantee is there that its members will not be subjected to coercion under various pretexts? Coker’s remark in this context is worth considering. He says, ‘There appears to be an underlying assumption in most pluralistic writing that if only an individual is released from state control, then we shall have a condition in which spontaneous action, self-expression and initiative, will enjoy free play. But many who raise the loudest outcry against state encroachments upon individual or group freedom are the most ardent supporters, or the most complacent tolerant, of other forms of social coercion.’⁹⁹ We find that while pluralists seek to enlarge individual freedom and freedom of groups against the State, they fail to secure freedom of the individual against the groups, lest they invite the State to do that. Not only this, state’s intervention is also called upon when there is conflict between interests of the individual as member of one association with that of the other or for that matter, with that of the State itself. As such, the individual–state antithesis remains unresolved and individual–group anti-thesis is to be mediated first. This requires the State to be a regulator.
• The freedom or independence of groups and their equality vis-à-vis the state poses another significant practical problem in a multi-religious and welfare state. For example, freedom for church in a multi-religious society amounts to equal freedom for all religious groups and their institutionalized seat of religious organization be it Christian church, Muslim mosque, Hindu temple, Jewish synagogue or Buddhist vihara. Left without intervention, potential conflict amongst these groups cannot be avoided. Further, the concept of secular state requires that not any one of these groups dictate their terms to the detriment of any minority group in the political, economic and other fields. Not only to avoid social conflict but also to fulfil certain welfare functions, the primacy of the state is called for. As one writer maintains, this would call for subjecting the groups to both civil and criminal law of the land formulated by the State and also to the taxation law.¹⁰⁰
• Laski and MacIver have sought to relate the authority of the State with the service provided by it. MacIver says that since the State does not provide an all-encompassing service, it has no claim to an overarching authority. Similarly, Laski says, ‘The authority of the State is a function of its ability to satisfy the effective demands that are made upon it.’¹⁰¹ However, we can argue that it is not the quantitative aspects of service—how many types of service the State provides—rather whether, as Coker says, ‘the comprehensive and compulsive authority exercised by the State is essential for maintenance of justice and social welfare.’¹⁰² In fact, several functions of the State are of primary importance even as conditions for existence of these groups. Functions like defence, policing, taxation, public infrastructure, etc., cannot be done by any group.
• Pluralists not only reject the monist doctrine but also cherish a vision of a pluralist state. This vision gets its reflection in phrases which term the state as ‘association of associations’, organization of organizations’, or ‘societies of societies’. In this way, state becomes an ensemble of various groups and its authority federal leading to dispersal of power. This formulation also implies that authority, instead of being vertical, is coordinate or parallel. Now, given the fact that state cannot be either ‘association of associations’ or ‘organization of organizations’ or ‘societies of societies’ without assuming a coordinating, regulative and adjudicating role over other groups, pluralists with varying degrees accept the primacy of the state in this field. Some, like Follett, sound unpluralistic as when she declares that ‘home of my soul is in the state.’ Laski is equally conceding when he terms the state as ‘crowning-point of modern social edifice’ enjoying supremacy over other social groupings. In this way, authority necessarily becomes vertical or pyramidal with the State having larger or even a supreme share. Pluralists, while pointing to a goal in which the state is reduced to a lower level or at par with and in league with other groups, at times come back to what Coker says, ‘pretty closely to a thoroughly monistic position.’
• Pluralists also fail to clearly state the objective and organizational structure of the pluralist state. What is the organization, scheme and authority structure of a non-sovereign pluralist state? The fact that the pluralist state is ‘association of associations’, organization of organizations’, or ‘societies of societies’, it ‘integrates but does not absorb’ groups. K. C. Hsiao has defined pluralist state as one in which ‘there exists no single source of authority that is all competent and comprehensive.’¹⁰³ If this is the pluralist state, then who does the regulation, adjustment and coordination, which pluralists seek.
• Significantly, the pluralist state is not aimed at advocating social and cultural pluralism. It does not envisage a multicultural society or does not support cultural relativism. It seeks only to advocate diversity of groups for limiting state sovereignty. It says power should be dispersed amongst various groups in society, but it is silent as how the parity and equality of this power be maintained amongst the groups.

Thus, we find that despite their rejection of the monist theory of sovereignty, pluralists have not been able to give a coherently structured alternative. We can capture the pluralist’s dilemma as follows:

• They want sovereignty to be rejected but at the same time seek to pluralize it, which is a contradiction in itself.
• They want the state to be discredited but also that it should be there to regulate, adjust and coordinate the group activities and social life. And that too without precision and scope of this regulation, adjustment or coordination.
• They say authority of law is beyond the State, but want the State to give it formal expression.
• They want a pluralist state with ‘maximal diversity of groups but within an over-arching authority’.¹⁰⁴
• They want to ensure individual liberty and freedom by securing autonomy of groups to which an individual has deeper loyalties. But accept that no one group encompasses all the interests of the individual and there can be conflict between the one and the other requiring the same freedom to be preserved by the state against which they labour their arguments.
• In their zeal to protect group autonomy, pluralists forget that groups can be equally, if not more, ‘oppressive, mean-minded and destructive of liberty as any state’.
• Summing up their dilemma, Coker says, ‘The pluralists have not made clear the implication of their criticism of the monistic doctrine … Will they expunge from political theory the principle of compulsory taxation and compulsory citizenship applied to persons by virtue of residence rather by virtue of voluntary memberships?’¹⁰⁵

However, notwithstanding their dilemma, the pluralist approach underlined the fact that state should not claim moral absolutism and legal supremacy at the cost of the freedom that an individual enjoyed through affiliations to various groups in society. Mary Parker Follett, a pluralist but at times waging an unpluralistic note, summarizes contribution of pluralism as¹⁰⁶:

• Pluralists prickled the bubble of the State’s right to supremacy.
• They recognized the value of the groups and pointed out that the significance of variety of group life must be recognized in political life.
• They pleaded that the interests of the State is always identical with the interests of its parts.
• Pluralism thus marked the beginning of disappearance of the people as a mere crowd.
• It seized upon the problem of associations and federalism in respect of sovereignty.

Nevertheless, we should not miss the fact that pluralists argue for what Vincent calls ‘a notion of the state’ and that notion is based on ‘pluralist state mediated by a complex vision of group life’. Thus, in the end it seems, they retain the State and adjust it to suit pluralist vision. While they denounce and expunge state sovereignty and declare it unfruitful, they concede enough roles to the state and at times, they reach the same conclusion that an innocuous monist would reach. Our present-day experience in the functioning of the welfare state suggests that authority of the state has been justified. On the other hand, however, influence of groups cannot be ignored either, which appears in the form of pressure or interest groups. The theories of power élite (C. Wright Mills) or dominant proprietary classes (Pranab Bardhan) suggest that pluralist’s idea of power dispersal may not be realistic as it would always be taken advantage of by a few groups. Robert Dahl’s theory of polyarchy, however, shows that bargaining by various groups within the polity amongst themselves and also with the State may ensure equilibrium and fair play.

We can conclude by saying that to see the problem of sovereignty and power of the State only in legal terms as if it is detached from the power relations in society and seek a solution by distributing it amongst the groups in society, as the pluralists do, is to miss the real issue. Without addressing the issue of power structure in society and its economic relations, neither legal sovereignty nor pluralized sovereignty can secure the real freedom and self-realization of the individual. In fact, ‘liberal-capitalist society will become unworkable without some hegemony of power …’¹⁰⁷ and the pluralist state conceptualized within the liberal framework will come very near to what the anarchists argue for. To save this ignominy, the pluralists rightly install ‘the state as neutral arbiter or umpire’ and in the end do not disturb the liberal-capitalist apple cart.