Category: Models For Decision Making
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Een digitale avondroutine die bij je aandacht past
Een avond op de bank kan ongemerkt vollopen met apps, meldingen en korte momenten waarop je niet goed weet wat je eigenlijk zoekt. Een betere digitale routine begint daarom niet bij de vraag welke dienst het populairst is, maar bij een praktische keuze: hoeveel tijd en aandacht wil je aan ontspanning geven? Dat geldt ook…
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Spinmillion: Why a Big Welcome Offer Isn’t the Whole Story
A large bonus can make an online casino look straightforward: sign up, claim an offer and play. Spinmillion’s advertised Welcome Package is substantial, listed as up to €2,000, 200 Free Spins and a Wheel of Fortune. But the headline is only one part of the offer. Withdrawal thresholds, identity checks, wagering rules and inactivity terms…
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A financial application: The Black–Litterman model
We considered portfolio optimization in Example 12.5 and in Section 13.2.2. For the sake of convenience, let us reconsider the problem here. We must allocate our wealth among n risky assets and a risk-free one. The returns of the risky assets are a vector of random variables with expected value μ and covariance matrix Σ; let rf be the return of the risk-free asset. Let w0 be…
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Bayesian estimation
Consider the problem of estimating a parameter θ, characterizing the probability distribution of a random available X. We have some prior information about θ, that we would like to express in a sensible way. We might assume that the unknown parameter lies anywhere in the unit interval [0, 1], or we might assume that it is close to…
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SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY: THE BAYESIAN VIEW
We took a rather standard view. On the one hand, we have introduced events and probabilities according to an axiomatic approach. On the other hand, when dealing with inferential statistics, we have followed the orthodox approach: Parameters are unknown numbers, that we try to estimate by squeezing information out of a random sample, in the…
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DYNAMIC FEEDBACK EFFECTS AND HERDING BEHAVIOR
Game theory in its simplest form does not consider dynamics, as it revolves around a static equilibrium concept: It posits a situation such that no player has an incentive to deviate. But how is that equilibrium reached dynamically? And what about the disorderly interaction of many stakeholders, maybe stockholders in financial markets? Addressing such issues is beyond…
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BRAESS’ PARADOX FOR TRAFFIC NETWORKS
The result of the collective interaction of noncooperative players may be occasionally quite surprising. We illustrate here a little example of the Braess’ paradox for traffic networks.18 Imagine a traffic network consisting of links such as road segments, bridges, and whatnot. Most of us had some pretty bad experiences with traffic jams. Intuition would suggest that…
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Simultaneous vs. sequential games
In this section we consider Nash equilibrium for the case in which a continuum of infinite actions is available to each player. To be specific, we analyze the behavior of two firms competing with each other in terms of quantities produced. Both firms would like to maximize their profit, but they influence each other since…
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Nash equilibrium
The concepts that we have used so far make sense, but they are a bit too restrictive and limit the set of games for which we may make reasonable predictions. A better approach, in a sense that we should clarify, is Nash equilibrium. Before formalizing the concept, imagine a game in which there is one…
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Equilibrium in dominant strategies
Sometimes, it is fairly easy to argue which outcome is to be expected. If we consider the strategies for firm A in Table 14.1, we see that: So, whatever firm B plays, firm A is better off by playing low. The symmetry of the game implies that the same consideration applies to firm B, which will also…