Functionalists generally look at the prevailing structures and explain their existence and continuity in terms of the functions they perform for society. Implicit in such an approach is the assumption that functions provide the raison d‘etre, while non-functional items become vestiges—this is how biologists view organic systems. Of course, Merton introduced new elements which helped to demonstrate the utility of the functional approach, not only for the advocacy of the status quo, but also to explain the changes that occur in all social systems. In such a broadened perspective, the analysis of social stratification takes the Weberian paradigm further.

Haralambos and Heald summarize the Parsonian view of stratification in the following manner:

 

Parsons sees social stratification as both inevitable and functional for society. It is inevitable because it derives from shared values which are a necessary part of all social systems. It is functional because it serves to integrate various groups in society. Power and prestige differentials are essential for the coordination and integration of a specialized division of labour. Without social inequality, Parsons finds it difficult to see how members of society could effectively cooperate and work together. Finally, inequalities of power and prestige benefit all members of society since they serve to further collective goals which are based on shared values (Haralambos and Heald, 1980: 32).

 

On the phenomenon of stratification, the most quoted functionalist theory is the one given by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore (1967) in an article first published in 1945. Confronted with the fact that stratification is found in all known societies, Davis and Moore attempted to explain ‘in functional terms, the universal necessity which calls forth stratification in any social system’. For a society to function, one of the prerequisites is the allocation of roles and their proper execution. This requires role occupancy, which depends on the availability of the persons trained to do the specialized jobs, and on efficiency in their performance. When people with special skills are in short supply, and when training in skills requires long periods of time, their value gets enhanced; this is reflected in the payment for such services. In every society, jobs that require special skills are rated highly compared to unskilled labour. With the growth of societies from simpler forms to complex social systems, such specializations become imminent along with the meaningful division of labour, and the value profile of skills becomes far more differentiated.

The authors argue that since people differ in their skills—some are more efficient than others, and some skills are known to only a few—the rewards associated with them also differ. Unskilled or semi-skilled labour is more easily available and involves little training; therefore, it is poorly rewarded than higher skilled jobs. The authors distinguish between functional needs and the skills required to fulfil them. While any particular need may be functionally very important, it may not be given a high monetary value if people are easily available to perform the task associated with its fulfilment. Such jobs carry a smaller reward. Similarly, functionally more important positions carry a higher reward if there is a scarcity of qualified people to fill them. Thus, functional importance and the availability of talent to ‘do the job’ properly and efficiently lead to a differential system of rewards, leading to inequality in terms of power, prestige, or possession. The desire for better rewards motivates people to acquire the skills through training and education, and gives rise to competition.

 

Figure 14.1 Determination of Status based on Dual Criteria of (i) Functional Importance, and (ii) Scarcity of Human ResourceDetermination of Status based on Dual Criteria of (i) Functional Importance, and (ii) Scarcity of Human Resource

 

Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore believed that unequal social and economic rewards were an ‘unconsciously evolved device’ by which societies ensured the supply of talented individuals to properly perform important social roles. Thus, the most important functions are performed by the most talented persons, and the greatest rewards go to those positions that require the most training and are regarded as most important for maintenance of the social system. Davis and Moore see the system of differential payment based on the simple equation of demand and supply. The supply dimension was associated with socialization, education and training.

This theory continues to remain very appealing and highly influential, but is not without its critics. Strong opponents of this theory see in it a hidden agenda to perpetuate the ideology of capitalism and a counter-argument to Marx. Those dealing with actual social reality and who are not tied down to either ideological position have found it difficult to accept the explanations when confronted with empirical data. Examples have been advanced where functionally very significant tasks are performed by people who are poorly rewarded. When a mother cleans the faeces of her young child or cleans her family toilet or sweeps the floors and collects the garbage—all functionally very important tasks—she is neither paid, nor does she earn or lose her status; however, the same task, when performed for society as a whole by untouchable sweeper castes in India (known as Bhangis—a term that is now banned and was earlier replaced by the term Harijan by Mahatma Gandhi. Later, even that term was dethroned by the term Dalit, meaning oppressed, and used for a much broader group of castes), it is not only poorly rewarded, but the group is also allocated the lowest status in the system of stratification.

Those who supported Davis and Moore found explanations for such an anomaly in the fact that while the task was functionally very important, it does not require talent or much training, and hence the lower ranking. Those arguing against it have regarded the prevalence of such a practice as abhorrent and a gross violation of human rights. In the same terrain are questions raised with regard to slavery, where money power and political might subjugated people to a lower status and denied them access to education and training to improve their lot.

Davis and Moore are also criticized for not suggesting the criteria to determine the importance of positions in functional terms. A position that carries a higher reward need not necessarily be important in functional terms, and a functionally very important position may also remain poorly rewarded. Their assumptions stand the test when they are examined in the context of modern professions: a doctor is more functionally important than a nurse, a driver more important than his attendant (a khalasi). Critics have gone to the extent of saying that the theory is simply an apologia for inequality and hint at the hidden agenda to justify inequality, and reinforce existing power equations. Others regard this theory as tautological.

This brief seven-page article published in 1945 by young researchers studying under Parsons has been used in several sociological textbooks, and has thus been quite influential. While researches on stratification using this framework came to a halt in the 1980s, the Davis and Moore theory is still taught in introductory courses.

It was Melvin Tumin who provided an extensive criticism of this theory way back in 1967, first in the form of an article in the edited by Bendix and Lipset—in which the essay by Davis and Moore is also reproduced—and then in a separate titled Social Stratification: The Forms and Functions of Social Inequality (1967).

Tumin argued that the theory is parochial in the sense that it is derived from a knowledge of Western societies and does not take a comparative view. While questioning the basic assumptions of the theory, Tumin also listed the following dysfunctions of a system of stratification:

  1. Stratification limits the chances of discovering the talent available in a society.
  2. Stratification limits the possibility of expanding the productive resources of the society.
  3. Stratification provides the elite with the needed political power to reinforce the conservative ideology of maintaining the status quo.
  4. Stratification distributes favourable self-images unequally.
  5. Stratification encourages hostility and suspicion, and thus adversely affects social integration.

In the same tenor, G. Lenski took the criticism further and hinted at a Western capitalist bias in the theory. He also found the non-applicability of Marxist principles in even the former Socialist societies in Eastern Europe. Following Marxist principles, these societies, according to Lenski, succeeded in removing economic inequality, but political inequality could not be erased. The experiments in de-stratification conducted in Socialist societies failed to achieve the critical transformation in human nature predicted by Marx.

These societies were not fully successful even in removing economic inequality. This point is exemplified in the UNESCO publication titled Poverty in Transition and Transition in Poverty (edited by Yogesh Atal, 1999). ‘Countries that denied the existence of poverty and unemployment in the past, and that boasted of high literacy rates and skilled manpower are now acknowledging not only the prevalence of poverty but its sudden and rapid increase’ (Atal, 1999: 6). The 1997 Human Development Report said: ‘Eastern Europe and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have seen the greatest deterioration in the past decade. Income poverty has spread from a small part of their population to about a third—120 million people below a poverty line of $ 4 a day’. Atal raised the query:

 

Is it a new form of poverty that is emerging, or is it suppressed poverty that is resurfacing? During the socialist era, a distinction was made between the capitalist poor and the socialist poor. The capitalist poor were those who had been victims of the previous capitalist system and as such were given priority consideration in the new system for the amelioration of their situation. The socialist poor were the victims of the new system, such as the handicapped, the vagrants, and people with temporary jobs. The latter were never regarded as poor by the communist ideologues; they were considered as mere ‘aberrations’ (ibid.).

 

After the fall of Socialist societies, Lenski examined the data now available about them and found that Socialist societies were not entirely successful in bringing about equality. Only the degree of economic inequality was lowered as compared with the Western world. He concluded that Marxist societies failed ‘because of inadequate motivational arrangement including the under-motivation of ordinary workers, and misdirected motivation of managers and decision-makers. The malfunctions in those societies were inevitable consequences of the system itself’, and not due to some external factors.

In Lenski’s view, the problems found in Socialist societies are also present in the public sector of Western societies. He goes on to argue that the so-called capitalist societies are in fact ‘mixed’ economies, in which rewards are allocated partly on the basis of need, partly on the basis of work, and partly on the basis of property.

Other scholars have found the Davis and Moore theory inapplicable and have suggested that it is wrong to assume that all talented persons are rewarded—the rise of unemployment amongst the educated strongly contradicts their theory. Similarly, many persons of the upper strata owe their positions to their birth—ascription—rather than merit. The trend towards dynastic leadership in Indian politics is a case in point. One journalist remarked that current trends indicate that the future leadership, as represented in the country’s legislative bodies, would be drawn from some select dynastic families; the senior leadership in the country uses its influence in securing positions for their progeny. Genealogy plays its role even in the modern sector of democratic polity. Doubts are also raised about the suggested replacement of the existing practice by what is called meritocracy. Merit, by definition, makes a distinction between those who have merit and those who do not. This argument is advanced by educationists who oppose reservations on the basis of ‘backwardness’ in systems of higher education. It is all right, they argue, to have a policy of positive discrimination at the initial point of entry at school; once you are in, however, your progress and ascendancy is determined by your performance, that is, merit—and not by your parentage. Education, in this sense, is not an equalizer; it divides people in terms of talent and merit.

This leads to the general proposition that any group that begins with people of identical status gets stratified in due course of time as it grows and operates. A good example in this regard is offered by Israel’s experiment with setting up kibbutzes. There are about 240 kibbutzes in Israel, in which 4 per cent of the population of that country lives. These settlements of 200–700 people are basically agricultural communities, and are founded on the Marxist principle of ‘from everyone according to ability to everyone according to need’, with a view to creating egalitarian societies. In these societies, property is owned by the community; services—cooking, laundry, education of children, etc.—are freely available, and no wage differentials exist, so that wealth is not created or accumulated individually, giving rise to strata based on wealth. The studies of these experiments, however, revealed that in time, even these communities were stratified in terms of ‘leader-managers’ who constituted the upper stratum, and the ‘rank and file’ located below them. The distribution of authority and prestige followed these divisions. Kibbutzes are thus stratified in terms of power and prestige.

We have briefly outlined two positions: the Marxist and the Functionalist. Broadly speaking, one is ideological and the other explanatory. The Marxist position regards inequality as unacceptable and prescribes its dissolution—in fact, it predicts its ultimate departure. The Functionalist explanation takes for granted the existence of inequality in all societies and attempts to explain the reasons for it in functional terms. In both approaches, if one goes deeper, one will find that the existence of social inequality is not denied; the only difference is that the ideologues regard this as unacceptable and the analysts consider it inevitable. These issues came up when sociology was in its infancy and struggling to develop a suitable scientific paradigm for the investigation of the social sphere. As happens in the development of any discipline, the initial phase is characterized by competing perspectives that push their candidature for universal acceptability. This gives rise to various ‘schools’ of thought. The controversy surrounding social inequality is an excellent example of this non-conciliatory phase. Obviously the explanations offered by Weber, Parsons, and Davis and Moore appear to be part of the ideological debate against Marxism. But one can see them as referring to two separate concerns, namely (i) how to explain the universal presence of social inequality; and (ii) how to eradicate all forms of social inequality. Answers to both questions remain tentative to this day. The failure of Socialist societies and the kibbutz experiment in Israel reinforces the generalization about the inevitability of social stratification. But what causes this is still a researchable query.

 

André Béteille (born 30 September, 1934)

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(Photo: André Béteile)

 

Amongst Indian sociologists, Andre Beteille has done a good deal of thinking on the subject. He has edited of select readings on Social Inequality. At a time when scholars were pontificating on equality, he decided to work on inequalities, while neither justifying its existence nor highlighting its functional utility or denying the significance of equality. In his Introduction to the on Equality and Inequality: Theory and Practice, he said,

 

Equality and inequality are not merely subjects of scholarly interest, they are also matters of everyday concern …. On the one side, people try to find reasons for the inequalities that exist, and on the other, they argue that the existing inequalities are arbitrary or contingent and that there is nothing in the nature of things that requires their existence.

 

Elsewhere, he had written: ‘In the past, Indian society was unique in the extremes of which it carried the principle and practice of inequality; today Indian intellectuals appear unique in their zeal for promoting the adoption of equality in every sphere of society’. Both the attack on inequality and the defence of it are, according to Beteille, extreme positions based on either ideological predisposition or inadequate information.

 

It is a mistake to seek in the value system of traditional Hinduism a complete explanation of inequality in contemporary India. A great deal of that has its origin in India’s more recent historical experience. Colonial rule introduced Indians not only to a new Legal order but also to a new economic order. In terms of the attainment of equality the benefits of the latter were by no means as clear as those of the former (1983: 20).

 

Although he does not specifically follow Davis and Moore’s functionalist explanation, Beteille is convinced of the inevitability of inequality in all social systems. In a separate essay on ‘The Reproduction of Inequality’ (1991), Beteille analysed the reproduction of inequality in modern professions. He has argued that,

 

… some forms of inequality are constitutive of certain arrangements in all modern societies, and that inequalities of income, esteem, and authority have to find accommodation within the prevalent ideal of equality. But the matter does not end there, for we must deal not only with the prevalence of inequality but also with its social reproduction. We have to ask not only why social positions should be graded and ranked, but also how it comes about that the same sorts of persons occupy the same sorts of positions from one generation to the next (1999 [1991]: 129).

 

Taking the particular case of professionals—doctors, engineer or scientists—Beteille asks ‘whether it is possible or even desirable to have a social order’ in which all professionals are treated equal. Because such a situation,

 

will bespeak complete indifference to all distinctions of knowledge, skill, experience, and ability …. Where there are wide disparities among doctors, or among members of any other profession, it would be unreasonable to expect equality of treatment towards them. One would expect some inequality of rewards where it is recognized that such disparities exist …. Of course, inequality of esteem is difficult to measure, or even agree upon, in every case, so people tend to go by inequality of income which is a general, though by no means always a reliable, index of it (ibid.: 131).

 

Beteille makes a useful distinction between (i) the ‘principle of income differentials’, and (ii) ‘satisfaction with the existing differentials at any given place or time’. He also made a distinction between independent professions and salaried ones. Doctors and lawyers, for example, generally depended on the fees earned for their services by their clients, while those employed in the government or even private enterprises receive their salaries. For the independent professions, practitioners’ earnings depended on the fees they charged and the clients who came to them for their services. A popular and experienced doctor would thus be greatly in demand and clients would be willing to pay higher fees to claim his attention. Those who earn emoluments by working in an institution are paid by the norms set by the concerned body, and these norms may differ. Private hospitals offering high quality services and infrastructure charge huge fees and attract those clients who can afford to pay. Naturally, professionals working there receive better emoluments than those working in government-run hospitals and clinics. Specialists working there, who are not allowed to do any private practice, will be more affected. A further point of note is the ordering of services in terms of a hierarchy. From an intern to a senior surgeon, or physician, is a long journey; moreover, in the hospital hierarchy are two divisions: the administration and the professionals. In both, separate hierarchies exist. For example, in a hospital professionals are divided into senior and junior doctors, anaesthetists, senior and junior nurses/compounders, other helpers, lab assistants, cleaners and sweepers, etc. And there are different pay structures. Beteille draws attention to the fact that in these microcosms—the sub-systems—two types of comparisons are made: internally the gap between the highest paid and the lowest paid; and externally, with other organizations in terms of such income gaps between the top and the bottom ranks. These comparisons are also made in the name of parity and social equality.

Béteille makes a further distinction between occupational ranking and occupational mobility. He points out that in modern occupations, there is very little downward mobility.

To quote,

 

… one can speak meaningfully about upward and downward mobility only within a generally-accepted framework of ranks. It does not appear that many persons would actually wish to see all ranks abolished; for them, the requirement of ‘practical equality’… would be reasonably satisfied if there were relatively free movements across the ranks of the occupational hierarchy [1999 [1991]: 136-37].

 

He also makes the point that there is greater upward than downward mobility.

It is Béteille’s central argument that

 

… all things considered, it will be safe to say that the family plays a far more active role than caste in reproduction of inequalities associated with the new occupational system. The retreat of caste as an active agent for the reproduction of inequality at the upper levels, and the continuing, if not increasing, importance of the family constitute two most striking features of contemporary Indian society (ibid.: 139).

 

A similar point was made by Atal in his study of the Indian elections of 1967. Atal had pointed out that while the vocabulary of caste is used in the arena of politics, what happens is either at the supra-caste level or at the level of the family and kinsmen. For mass mobilization, the idiom of caste is used for drawing people belonging to a caste-cluster, but when it comes to the distribution of advantages and favours—called nepotism or Bhai-Bhatijawad—it is done not for all the members of the caste, but only for close kinsmen; the dynastic tendency in leadership is a good example of this.


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