Does political authority imply limitation on use of power? Alternatively, will doing away with the notion of political authority result in free flowing exercise of power by the state? We have discussed how authority is related to power by way of legitimacy. Power legitimately exercised is authority and the test of legitimacy in modern democracy is consent of the people to obey and give willing allegiance to the power exercised. Political authority represents the legitimately constituted power of the state and is an important achievement in modern democracy. In a constitutional democracy, political authority is generally exercised within the framework of popular sovereignty, power based on democratically and freely elicited consent, constitutionally limited power, rule of law, separation of powers, a charter of rights to citizens and checks and balances between the organs of the state. In a constitutional democracy, political authority can be exercised in this framework only. By its very nature, such authority is limited in its scope compared to the use of power, which is without concern for legitimacy. Power can be exercised openly and without even legitimate grounds. For example, the authoritarian and dictatorial regimes do exercise naked power invoking various undemocratic and extra-constitutional means. Arguably, viewed from this perspective, Mao’s call of power flowing from the barrel of the gun is different from power of the Indian Prime Minister that flows from the Constitution of India.
If we remove the factor of consent, willing obedience and legitimate base, on which power could be justified; use of power tends to become arbitrary, brute, coercive, naked and unreasonable. Lord Acton’s apprehension that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely revisits in several forms. We have colonial power massacring thousands in Jallianwala (in Punjab) firing, Hitler’s concentration camps, Idi Amin’s killing of hundred of thousands of countrymen, South African government practising apartheid, etc. as examples of power without a legitimate base. Contrary to this, exercise of power by political authority has to be within a framework based on consent, rule of law, reasonableness and by upholding the rights of the people. Power exercised in such a framework is limited power because political authority exercises power within constitutional limitations. Exercise of power when it relies on authority and legitimacy gets limited in its scope because it cannot be naked and open.
Political thinkers have extensively argued that power to be legitimate and enduring must invoke a ground that is based on will and consent of the people. Green, for example, when he says, ‘will, not force is the basis of the state’, hints that the power of the state must be based on consent of the people. For Green, ‘will’ is related to common consciousness of the common good. For Rousseau, ‘will’ is meaningful when it is an integral part of the General Will. In both cases, power exercised by the political authority has reference to the implied will of the people. For Green, common good is the reference point for justifying power. Locke had proposed doctrine of inalienable natural rights of the individuals as the basis for limiting political authority. The scope of protection of the natural rights in this case limits exercise of power by the political authority. Locke allows even right to revolt provided the state becomes incapable of protecting the natural rights. Locke also proposed that there should be division of powers between three different organs so that political authority is checked and balances. This idea gets its crowning reflection in the American Constitution. Montesquieu and Blackstone found separation of powers as internal mechanism to limit political authority.
J. S. Mill, in his On Liberty argued that the political authority should be limited by the scope of individual liberty. To the extent that the self-regarding actions of the individual do not harm others, political authority (or even social/political majority) is not justified in interfering in those actions. Libertarian theorists such as Friedrich Von Hayek, Isaiah Berlin, Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick argue that political authority should not interfere in the economic activities of the individuals. Political authority, in general, should not interfere with economic freedom and, in particular, individual liberty.
It appears that authority has two types of limitations—one that it cannot be exercised as mere power and must have reference to legitimacy to the extent of willing obedience; and second that exercise of political authority must have regard for individual liberty. However, the second is also part of the first limitation. If authority violates individual liberty, it is coercive, excessive and arbitrary and hence not legitimate. It is not merely a question of limiting exercise of power, the objective is to limit even the exercise of legitimate authority so that individual liberty is protected. Libertarian writers seek to limit the political authority to the minimum.
Andrew Vincent has identified three types of limitations and diversification of authority that have been applied.28 These include the following. Firstly, historical and legal limitations include ‘customary law’ (conservative like Edmund Burke supports), common law of England (K. C. Wheare calls ‘conventions’ and ‘usages’), written documents (e.g. constitutions, charter of rights). Secondly, institutional devices include separation of powers and checks and balances. Thirdly, moral and philosophical limitations include natural law and natural rights (now also includes human rights), theory of consent and social contract, popular sovereignty and democracy. In contemporary democracies, political authority functions within various checks and limitations and as such cannot exercise power without regard to rule of law, constitutional limits, representative consent of the people and popular opinion.
However, it is also important that power is not used in an arbitrary and excessive manner. It must be moderated and used relevant to the general welfare and benefit. Power used for sectional and extra-constitutional purposes is violative of the very logic of democratic and constitutional political authority. Thus, legitimate authority is preferable to naked power. In any case, if power used is relevant, beneficial and required, it qualifies for general acceptance and hence as legitimate.
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