Power

Power, Legitimacy and Authority

As our introductory remarks reveal, power is considered as an important analytical variable in the study and understanding of the political system and its processes. It is also important to understand the way institutions of the State exercise their authority and the circumstances in which authority faces legitimacy deficit and deficit of political obligation. This leads to protest against the policies and actions of the state. One may say that politics is all about acquisition, maintenance and use of power. However, what do we mean by power and how do we differentiate its various manifestations?

Power is generally understood as capacity to affect other’s behaviour by some form of sanction.⁴ Sanction can be in the form of punishments and coercion or rewards and inducements. As such, power can manifest in the form of reward, inducement, pressure, persuasion, intimidation, coercion or violence. These are intended to affect the behaviour of a targeted person or groups or communities to achieve the desired result. For example, during the colonial rule in India, the government resorted to firing against the Satyagrahis in 1919 at Jallianwala Bagh (Punjab). This was an example of use of power as violence to affect the behaviour of those who were protesting against the Rowlatt Acts. Presently, in the Indian electoral context, media reports suggest that political parties resort to distribution of various material things such as blanket, sarees, dhotis, rice, money, etc. amongst the electorate before the elections to seek votes of the people or groups or communities or a section of them. This can be an example of pressure through inducement to produce favourable electoral behaviour. This material inducement constitutes not only undue use of power but violates the principle that the individual is a rational choice maker and should not be induced or influenced to vote otherwise. We must note here that pressure, material inducements, violence, coercion, etc. are external factors that affect the behaviour of the agent.

There can also be use of influence in the form of moral persuasion, as in Satyagraha, which affects behaviour. Gandhi differentiates between power as ‘brute force’ and power as ‘soul-force or truth-force’.⁵ Satyagraha or moral persuasion comes under the category of truth-force and should not be considered as either coercion or inducement. For Gandhi, Satyagraha is related to correctness of means to achieve any goal. To counter brute force of the colonial power by violent means was unthinkable for Gandhi. He insisted on moral persuasion. Use of moral persuasion to influence behaviour of another person or agency that wields power, does not constitute use of brute force but only truth force. In Gandhi’s views, moral persuasion is an appeal based on truth and does not imply any external pressure or force.

Generally, power is understood as an external factor of affecting or controlling others behaviour. Max Weber defines power as ‘the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.’⁶ Realizing one’s own will against the resistance of others, means achieving the desired objectives even though those who are the subject of application of the pressure resist. Weber’s definition is characterized by use of power in a social relationship where one person or group of people possess power at the expense of others. This is a doctrine of a zero-sum power game. Power is exercised at the cost of others. In cases where two or more actors have equivalent power, then result will not favour either. Bertrand Russell corroborates this view when he defines power as ‘the production of intended results’. This means ability of a person or a group of persons to achieve desired results. This is power to achieve an outcome or intended result.

There can be another understanding of the concept of power. Some of the theorists such as Morton Kaplan, Harold Lasswell and Carl J. Friedrich have defined power in terms of relationship in which a person or a group of persons exercise control over others. While for Weber and Russell, power is power to realize one’s will or achieve a goal; for Kaplan, Lasswell and Friedrich, power is power over someone. For example, binding decisions over some one means control is being exercised. Government has power over its citizens because its makes binding decisions. In political systems analysis framework, Easton and Almond’s definitions of political system cited above also imply that power is a primary element.

Power is also differentiated from influence. Robert Dahl has made a distinction between power and influence.⁷. Modern Political Analysis, Dahl explains influence as relation among actors where intentions, preferences and actions of one or more actors affect the actions or intention to act of other actor(s). This means if action of one or more actors in a social situation affects the actions or intention to act of other actor(s), explicitly or implicitly, it can be said that the first set of actor(s) has influenced the second set of actors. When a binding decision is complied with or an intended result is achieved without use of violence, but by use of persuasion, inducements, controlled information, etc., it constitutes influence. Gandhiji’s Satyagraha may come under the category of influence through moral persuasion. Persuasion can be through moral appeal (Satyagraha) or manipulation (by providing incomplete information) or inducements (monetary or material gains). On the other hand, for Dahl, power is exercised when ‘compliance is attained by creating the prospect of severe sanctions for non-compliance’. Power is related to threat or sanction or what Almond would say, threat of employment of more or less legitimate physical compulsion.

There are a number of concepts that are used in the context of understanding the dynamics of power. For example, sovereignty, supremacy, power, violence, coercion, force, authority, influence, dominance, hegemony, etc., are applied to describe various forms or manifestations of power. We discuss its meanings and implication. We can briefly touch upon the concepts in order to understand the context in which ‘power’ is related to them Figure 13.1.

 

 

Figure 13.1 Manifestation of Various Forms of Power

 

It appears that ‘power’ as a relationship between state and individuals, state and groups, groups and individuals, can manifest in various forms. However, the question arises, on what grounds, that are acceptable, it should be acquired, maintained and used. The relationship between power and legitimacy depends on its acceptability by the subjects and citizens. Acceptability of the use of power by the subjects and citizens depends on various factors. They include:

• Power is not exercised in arbitrary manner but within the framework of law, either constitution, rule of law or an agreed code of law.
• Power is not exercised for selfish and personal gains but for public interests and general welfare including defence, law and order, social welfare, etc.
• Power being exercised has been acquired through acceptable means and the holder has entitlement to it. This has been either based on divine rights and hereditary transfer (monarchies in England, Japan, Bhutan) on democratic consent (democratic governments in countries such as Indian, USA, England and others) or acquisition by justified revolutionary means (Lenin in Russia,1917, Castro in Cuba,1957, etc.).
• Power exercised is reasonable and not coercive and disproportionate to ends to be achieved. Colonial power or authoritarian power, for example are criticized for their use of excessive coercive power and are treated as unacceptable.

Power exercised according to these criteria is generally considered acceptable and acceptability results in willing obedience to power being exercised. If there is willingness from the subjects and citizens to follow and obey, power is treated as legitimate. Thus, power is legitimate when there is willing obedience and allegiance to its exercise and all its products—legislation, laws, acts, orders, rules, etc. are generally obeyed as rightful. We are calling it as generally obeyed because they are subject to a limit on political obligation and right to resist. Green’s remark that ‘will, not force is the basis of the state’, should be understood in this context that power of the state is based on will of the people and not mere force of the state. In this way, we have the following equation between power, its acceptability, legitimacy and authority. When exercise of power is generally acceptable and its products willingly obeyed, power becomes legitimate. Legitimate power, we call authority (Figure 13.2).

 

 

Figure 13.2 Power, Legitimacy and Authority

 

By its very nature then, authority becomes an acceptable form of exercise of power, influencing behaviour of others for achieving certain ends or desired outcomes, or exercising control over others. Authority is automatically and unquestionably followed. However, there can be circumstances when influencing others behaviour may not constitute exercise of authority. For example, influencing by application of either excessive persuasion or coercion is not authority. As we have defined power, both persuasion and coercion are considered as a means of influencing behaviour of others. However, it may not carry authority. Heywood suggests that ‘Much of electoral politics amounts to an exercise in persuasion …’⁸ through campaign, rallies and meetings.

These are aimed at influencing electoral behaviour, as there may not be automatic and willing obedience towards a party’s policies and manifesto. There is no ‘duty to obey’ a particular party unless there is political affiliation and membership that is either cadre-based or based on loyalty. In such situations, in the end it cannot be said that authority has been exercised because of two reasons: one, that electorates may not vote for a party or parties that exercised influence, and there is no duty to obey willingly. A second example can be cited of religious conversions. Arguably, it is felt that religious conversions do not always carry the authority of the religions converted to rather they are results of material and economic inducements. This means, if conversion is not a result of conviction of conscience of the person being converted, persuasion and influence in the form of inducement has been used. However, it may also happen that conversion is due to the exploitative and indignifying conditions being offered by a particular socio-religious set-up. In this case, an egalitarian and just order being offered by another religion will exercise authoritative influence. Thus, authority as an automatic and willing influence is distinguished here from influencing by persuasion and inducements. Influencing by coercion does not carry any willing obedience and does not constitute authority. Colonial or dictatorial power is often treated as coercive and devoid of authority.

However, it should be noted here that exercise of authority is dependent upon exercise of power. While power can be exercised with authority behind it, there cannot be authority with power behind it. While power is understood in the sense of power or ability to achieve a desired outcome by influencing others’ behaviour or exercise of control by one over the other, authority is right to influence or control. Thus, authority is the justifying means to exercise power. Authority, in short, is a form of power that carries rightful justification for exercise of power. Heywood while distinguishing between the two, suggests that while ‘power can be defined as the ability to influence the behaviour of another, authority can be understood as the right to do so’.⁹ He further adds that power brings about compliance through persuasion, pressure, threats, coercion or violence, while authority is based upon a ‘perceived right to rule’ and brings about compliance through a moral obligation to obey. In short, we can say that while power can be coercive either violent or non-violent, authority is always based on willingness of the subjects and citizens. In modern democracies, consent based representative governments are considered to carry authority. This is because their source of power is people’s supremacy.

Besides democratically aggregated consent, there can be different grounds to justify power as legitimate. German sociologist Max Weber discusses at least three grounds. Max Weber, while dealing with types of authority, deals with the grounds on which authority is treated as legitimate. He categorizes them into traditional, charismatic and legal–rational authority. While the first seeks legitimacy on the ground of tradition, custom and religious and other beliefs and is characterized by hereditary transfer of power, the second is purely personal and depends on personal traits and charismatic and extraordinary qualities possessed by certain individuals that influence people. The third type of authority is based on impersonal order and seeks legal and rational ground for its justification. The authority that we associate with monarchies presently in Britain, Bhutan and Nepal, etc. according to Weber, would be traditional authority. The authority that people such as Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Mother Teresa, or for that matter, Lenin, Hitler and Mao carried would be charismatic authority. Weber identified ‘bureaucracy’ (as he defined it) with legal–rational authority. However, Weber does not discuss the authority that a Prime Minister or a President carries in a democracy. It appears neither traditional nor charismatic. Some prime ministers or presidents may be charismatic but the authority they carry is not charismatic. Primarily, their authority emanates from the people and hence we may call them popular authority or democratic authority. However, they do carry legal–rational characteristics such as working under the constitution of the country and the rule of law.

While Weber attempted to define legitimacy in terms of sources from which it is drawn, David Beetham in his The Legitimation of Power has sought to show that ‘power can be said to be legitimate only if three conditions are fulfilled’.¹⁰

The three conditions include: (i) power exercised according to established rules (formal legal codes or informal conventions), (ii) these rules to be justified in terms of shared beliefs of the government and the governed, (iii) legitimacy to be demonstrated by expression of consent on the part of the governed. Beetham’s first condition is similar to that of Weber’s criteria of established rules of the legal–rational authority. The second condition is problematic when we judge many rules that the colonial government formulated for the colonized people and have come to be accepted as shared. The third criterion is the basis of democratically elicited representative governments and democratic electoral process.

Suppose we have to consult the political masters of the past, and some of the present, as if we are asking them as to what bases and grounds they would like to attribute for power being legitimate and rightful (See Table 13.1). Can we attribute the following grounds on their behalf?

 

Table 13.1 Masters’ Grounds for Power Exercised Being Rightful and Legitimate

Masters	Justification and grounds
Plato	Power exercised by the philosopher-king who has the Idea of Good (Plato’s Republic)
Aristotle	Balanced power in the mixed constitution of Polity for the sake of good life exercised by the middle class (Aristotle’s Politics)
Kautilaya	Power exercised by the king for protection (Raksha), internal order (Palana) and welfare of the people (Yogakshema) (Kautilaya’s Arthashastra)
Marcus Cicero	Power exercised in conformity with Law, right reason in Nature, that results in balance between monarchical, patrician and plebeian elements (Cicero’s De Republica—the Republic and De Legibus, the Laws)
St. Augustine	Power exercised in a Christian commonwealth in accordance with the requirements of City of God (Augustine’s The City of God)
Thomas Hobbes	Power exercised by the Leviathan to secure and preserve the life of the people (Hobbes’s Leviathan)
John Locke	Power exercised to safeguard natural rights of life, liberty and property (Locke’s Two Treatises on Civil Government)
Jean J. Rousseau	Power exercised by the General Will to secure Civil Liberty (Rousseau’s The Social Contract)
Jeremy Bentham	Power exercised to secure greatest happiness of the greatest number (Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation)
George F. W. Hegel	Power exercised by any State is legitimate as state is march of God on earth (Hegel’s Philosophy of Right)
Thomas H. Green	Power exercised by the state to provide conditions for fulfilment of man’s moral capacity and common good (Green’s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation)
John StuartMill	Power can be rightfully exercised over any person, against his will, is to prevent harm to others, i.e., interference in ‘other-regarding’ actions (Mill’s On Liberty)
Karl Marx	Power exercised in a class society is a class power—power to appropriate the labour of others, it cannot be legitimate. Power is legitimate only when it is used to prevent one’s appropriation of labour by others (Marx and Engel’s Manifesto of the Communist Party)
Harold J. Laski	The authority of a state is a function of its ability to satisfy the effective demands that are made upon it [e.g., for security, religious freedom and toleration, etc.] (Laski’s An Introduction to Politics)
Mohandas K. Gandhi	Power exercised being violent can never be legitimate. Only power of truthful moral persuasion (Satyagraha) is legitimate, as fair means only can produce fair ends (Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj)
C.B. Macpherson	Power exercised to provide conditions of moral development of man (Macpherson’s The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy)
John Rawls	Power exercised to ensure distributive justice (Rawls’s A Theory of Justice)
Robert Nozick	Power exercised by the state is minimal (Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia)
Amartya Sen	Power exercised by the state for human capability expansion, such as health, education, basic human facilities (water, sanitation, shelter), social security, etc. (Dréze and Sen’s INDIA: Economic Development and Social Opportunity)