Liberty and Equality Are Compatible and Complementary

While laissez-faire, liberal-capitalist, negative liberal and libertarian perspectives reject any complementary relationship between liberty and equality, positive liberal, social-democratic and state welfare perspectives treat the two as compatible and complementary. The argument follows the following lines:

• Liberty of individual cannot be conceived in isolation and it has to be a concept of, what L. T. Hobhouse (Elements of Social Justice) calls, ‘harmonized liberties’, or Ernest Barker (Principles of Social and Political Theory) says, ‘regulated liberty’ or Dorothy Pickles (Introduction to Politics) calls, ‘equal liberty’. This means liberty in a society or democracy means equal liberty for all without which it may be a society with special privileges.
• Equality is required to make liberty substantive. Liberty should not be liberty in terms of legal and political rights, but should also include liberty in terms of economic and material security. This means equality in liberty is essential. Tawney argues on this line. Laski also attaches importance to economic equality as a precondition to political liberty. Macpherson argues that ‘developmental power’ being positive conditions of the realization of power of an individual in the developmental sense must be equally available.
• Equality is essential for democracy and democracy for liberty. Political equality in democracy is essential and there cannot be political equality without social and economic equality. Without equality, liberty will be in danger. If liberty is an end of democracy, equality is its means and the two cannot be divorced from each other. Coker however feels that those who attack democracy even go to the extent of saying that ‘equality is not only democracy’s initial hypothesis but also its constant objective.’⁵⁹
• Equality and liberty are complementary because they operate towards the same end. ‘Development of personality’ of the individual is the supreme value and liberty aims at realization of potentialities. Equality is derived from this supreme value and aims at equal realization of potentialities. Thus, both liberty and equality are working towards the same end. Hobhouse and Barker argue on this line.

Tawney in his book Equality maintains that equality is necessary to make liberty substantive. For him, liberty should imply not only civil and political rights, but also security for economically weak. Tawney is of the view that ‘a large measure of equality, so far from being inimical to liberty, is essential to it.’ L. T. Hobhouse in his book Elements of Social Justice treats system of rights as system of harmonized liberties. It means maximum degree of freedom to each, compatible with the same degree of freedom to others. An Individual’s personal liberties and restraints should be harmonized, which means rights and duties should be equally enforced.

Barker is of the view that enjoyment of liberty by all requires adjustments and adjustment of liberty of one with others requires regulation. The greatest common possible measure of liberty can be determined and defined by the need of each to enjoy similar and equal liberty with others. Thus, liberty of each is to be adjusted to others and it has to be regulated. Regulated liberty means it has to be equal liberty for all. Barker holds that both liberty and equality are required to serve the supreme value of development of personality. As such, they are derivative values coming out of the requirement of development of personality. This requires liberty for realization of potentialities and equality for equal realization of potentialities and development of personality. Both liberty and equality are working towards the same end. If this interpretation is to be followed, liberty and equality are compatible.

Laski criticizes Tocqueville and Acton for holding equality and liberty as contradictory. He gives equal importance to both equality and liberty and ‘considers economic equality as precondition to political liberty.’⁶⁰ By equality, Laski means equal opportunity for all to develop their capacities. He exhorts that if liberty is to be made a universal category, a certain levelling process in the economic sphere must be accepted. For him, political freedom and economic equality are complementary concepts.

Some of the earlier writers such as Maitland, Hume and Harrington also supported complementariness of liberty and equality.⁶¹ Hume said, when we depart from equality we rob the poor of more satisfaction and liberty than we add to the rich.’ Harrington established a relationship between the two in this manner, ‘equality of estates caused equality of power and equality of power is liberty.’ Another writer, A. F. Pollard has said, ‘There is only one solution to of the problem of liberty and it lies in equality.’

Thus, we find enough support for both the schools that treat equality as compatible with each other and incompatible with each other. The Marxian perspective gives primacy to equality and that to economic equality and treats liberty primarily in economic terms. However, this is not in terms of private property, contract and free market but social ownership of the means of production. Liberty in socialist society is not divorced from the social ownership of means of production. Equality and liberty are basis of democracy, just social order, and as Barker says, development of personality. The two must be treated as complementary and reconciled with each other. A welfare democratic state presents a practical approximation for reconciling equality and liberty.