Liberty and Equality Are Incompatible and in Conflict

The argument of incompatibility of liberty and equality is primarily based on the assumptions that search for social and economic equality is against individual liberty and economic freedom. This is because, they argue:

  • Democracy gives premium to equality. With operation of public opinion and majority rule in democracy, individual liberty may not be given primacy. Both J. S. Mill (On Liberty) and Alex de Tocqueville (Democracy in America) argued on this line.
  • Liberty in negative sense is understood as absence of external restraint or intervention. Equality, on the other hand, seeks the state’s intervention to acquire either a level-playing field or economic redistribution. Liberty seeks a negative state and equality seeks a positive state. Hence, the two are incompatible. This position is reflected in laissez faire, negative liberal and libertarian positions.
  • Any measure of correcting market produced inequality to ensure social and economic equality, requires intervention by authority of the state for welfare, planning and redistribution. To this extent, the state imposes external criteria of redistribution and justice. This constitutes curtailment of individual liberty and economic freedom. F. A. Hayek (The Road to Serfdom and The Constitution of Liberty) and Milton Friedman have argued on this line.
  • Economic freedom, in the sense of private property, contract and free market, is an important component of individual liberty. Economic freedom promotes political freedom by separating economic power and political power and thus enabling the one to offset the other. Equality will curtail economic freedom and as a result individual liberty and political freedom also. Friedman (Capitalism and Freedom) holds such a view.
  • Freedom in a negative sense stands for not being coerced or interfered by others. This should be distinguished from conditions of freedom, e.g., freedom to swim from inability to swim, as the two are different things. One is freedom per se and the other condition of freedom. Search for socio-economic equality is based on search for providing conditions of freedom. This may result in intervention, coercion and curtailment of individual liberty. Isaiah Berlin (‘Two Concepts of Liberty’) has argued on this line and says ‘paternalism can provide condition of freedom, yet withhold freedom itself’.

Alex de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America treats development of democracy as a sign of ‘the formation of a “modern society” (by contrast with the ancien regime) in France, England and America.’57 For Tocqueville, consequences of democratic revolution or development of democracy were clear—and to quote Bottomore, it was to ‘produce social equality, by abolishing hereditary distinctions of rank and by making all occupations, rewards and honours accessible to every member of society.’ Tocqueville perceived that this tendency has both desirable and undesirable aspects. While he was hopeful of the positive effect in terms of well-being of the greatest number, he felt that pursuit of social equality might become ‘an insatiable passion’ in democratic communities leading to loss of individual liberty. Tocqueville was apprehensive of two consequences: one, tyranny of majority (as Mill was), and two, loss of liberty due to equality coming into conflict with the liberty of individuals. He felt that in the extreme case, passion for equality might lead to, what Tocqueville called, ‘equality in slavery’. Tocqueville was apprehensive that public opinion and views of majority, being treated supreme in democracy, might be inimical to development of individual liberty. This was the same conclusion that Mill has also drawn and cautioned against loss of individual liberty. Tocqueville was equally apprehensive of the conflict between liberty and equality though he also found a desirable aspect of equality in democracy.

John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, popularly known as, Lord Acton, an English historian, who planned the Cambridge Modern History, argued that the doctrine of equality was incompatible with liberty. He says, ‘… the passion for equality makes vain the hope of freedom! His main concern was the perceived conflict between the two in the political sphere, which means erosion of the independent authority, and increase in the authority of the state. He favoured ‘vesting adequate power in the intermediate voluntary associations’58 as a solution to this incompatibility.

In the twentieth century, neo-liberal or libertarian writers have found conflict between liberty and equality. Hayek, Berlin, Friedman and Nozick are the main exponents.

F. A. Hayek defines individual freedom in a negative sense as ‘freedom from subjection of coercion of arbitrary will of others.’ As it appears, he treats liberty in a negative sense and rejects positive or developmental view of liberty. He considers liberty in positive sense as inimical to individual liberty. This is because he apprehends that any form of intervention of the state in the name of securing sources of liberty, as the conception of positive liberty does, may lead to collectivist justification of state interference. On this ground, Hayek opposes planned economy and distributive justice. He feels that conception of distributive justice imposes some other’s conception of merit and requires allocation of resources through central intervention. Further, he justifies that in the market, there is equality of opportunity. However, since individuals differ in their talent and skill, it results in inequality of outcome, which should not be tampered with. For Hayek, equality and liberty are incompatible because equality necessarily leads to the concept of distributive justice, equality of outcome and state intervention. In the name of equality or justice, there should not be enactment of rules that specify how people should use the means at their disposal. Interference with people’s own capacity to determine their objective becomes coercive and hence incompatible with individual liberty.

Another neo-liberal, Isaiah Berlin looks at liberty in a new way (‘Two Concepts of Liberty’), and portrays that in its negative and positive sense, liberty means the same thing. Liberty in the negative sense is defined as an area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. Liberty in this sense, is principally concerned with the area of control and not with its source (whether the individual himself is the source of liberty or it emanates from being not interfered from outside). In a positive sense, liberty is ‘being ones own master. In both the cases, freedom to act is the essence of liberty. However, what is important is to differentiate between freedom or liberty per se and the condition of freedom. Mere absence of condition of freedom does not mean there is no freedom. However, concern with condition of freedom invariably is related with conception of equality, justice and interference. To this extent, in pursuit of provision for condition of freedom, the very area of freedom gets restricted. For example, liberty to buy a packet of bread is not the same thing as the capacity to buy. When capacity to buy becomes important, equality becomes the main deriving concern. As a result, in pursuit of the condition of freedom, freedom per se is either overlooked or lost. As such, Berlin finds equality and liberty in conflict. In fact, he also argues that forms of government, either autocracy or democracy, have no direct relationship with negative liberty. Democracy may deprive individuals of many liberties, while a liberal-minded despot may allow a large measure of personal freedom. Hayek also held Berlin’s view that there is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic rule. Berlin is categorical when he says, the connection between democracy and individual liberty is a good deal more tenuous than it seemed to many advocates of both.

Milton Friedman defines freedom as ‘absence of coercion of a man by his fellow men.’ He equates liberty or freedom with economic freedom. Economic freedom means freedom of choice in the market place—freedom of the producer what to produce and whom to employ, freedom of the consumer what to buy, freedom of the worker to choose a job or profession. It is easy for him to conclude that the market must have a larger sphere of activity so that sphere of freedom is enlarged because freedom means freedom of free market. This is also a check on the power of the state. On the other hand, concept of equality leads to redistributive aspects and necessarily to the intervention of the state. To this extent, equality leads to restriction on free market and as a result on liberty.

Robert Nozick seeks to protect the realm of individual liberty so much that he warns against governments coercing citizens even for their own good or protection. Nozick asserts that the state may not be justified in compelling people to help others. This implies that the state should not tax people or take away their earned property in the name of welfare redistribution or justice or equality. Nozick’s libertarian position and minimalist state perspective leads him to find equality in conflict with liberty.


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