Laski’s rejection of sovereignty and absolutist state begins with the criticism of the monist theory of sovereignty. He employs three grounds for refuting monist concept of sovereignty and these do not necessarily involve pluralistic arguments. His criticism is based on three grounds—historical, legal and political. In his Grammar of Politics and Foundations of Sovereignty, Laski provides refutations of the monist theory on these grounds.
According to Laski, historically the concept of sovereignty has not been universal and perpetual. It has historical origin and the historical period is associated with the struggle of the State against religious claims of temporal supremacy. In his Grammar of Politics, he says, ‘the territorial and omnipotent state is the off-spring of the religious struggles of the sixteenth century’ and ‘the sovereign state emerges to vindicate the supremacy of the secular order against religious claims.’64 In our survey of the evolution of the State, we have seen how claim of religious and ecclesiastical supremacy by the church in the medieval period sought to extend to temporal supremacy. As monarchy was struggling to gain its ground against this church-claimed supremacy, theorists like Bodin gave the concept of sovereignty to provide a theoretical basis to the claim of monarchy against the religious claims of the church. In his book, Foundations of Sovereignty, Laski gives elaboration of this position and maintains that monist theory of sovereignty is born and revered as a result of crisis.65 For example, Bodin asserted the supremacy of the State in an age of religious warfare. Similarly, Hobbes sought the means of order in a period when the King-in-Parliament battled for the balance of power. Hobbes argued for absolute state power lest anarchy would follow and drew analogy of the state of nature. According to Laski, Austin’s book was conceived at a time when the middle classes of France and England had achieved the conquest of a state hitherto partly open to their ambition.66 And Austin’s concept of sovereignty was to provide a device for perpetual status quo. Laski, in unmistakable terms, explains the historical origin of sovereignty when he says, ‘its (the state) character as a sovereign body was a product of a long chain of historical circumstances of which the most important was the need, at a time of the Reformation, to find a plane of organization to which all claims to authority could be referred for ultimate decision. The State secured its primacy over all other associations because at that period, it offered prospects of ordered peace such as no other body could pretend to secure.’67
Thus, sovereignty emerged in a particular period and was asserted to fulfil particular demands or interests. Dispersal of political power in medieval Europe on the one hand, and contest between religious and temporal forces on the other, created condition for the theory of sovereignty. It was felt necessary for making general rules capable of securing order and peace. Historically, the concept of sovereignty was absent in the Greek period and during the medieval period, which is known more by lack of sovereignty than by its presence. In fact, it is generally agreed that in medieval Europe power was decentralized and represented an ensemble of suzerainty than sovereignty. Further, present times show evolution of international organization of an allegiance that reaches beyond the limits of the state. In his An Introduction to Politics, Laski says, ‘Austin’s world was one in which the state seemed the last term in the evolution of institutions’ and further adds, ‘our world is different world. What impresses us is not national separation but international dependence.’ Laski’s remark in this regard is conclusive when he says, ‘the sovereignty of the state in the world to which we belong is as obsolete as the sovereignty of the Roman Church three hundred years ago.’68 In yet another reference in his Liberty in the Modern State Laski writes, ‘we have entered upon an epoch in which it is daily more clear that the principle of national sovereignty has exhausted its usefulness. Certain functions of government are so clearly international in character that we cannot rely upon the cooperation of so-called ‘independent and equal’ sovereign states to achieve the cosmopolitan law-making that has become essential.’69 As a result of these historical factors, Laski finds that sovereignty was neither there to begin with nor required in our times of international dependence and cooperation.
Secondly, he criticized Austin’s theory on legal ground. Legal supremacy of the sovereign reflected in the doctrine, law is command of the sovereign, may be considered as the backbone of the Austin’s theory and of the monist concept of sovereignty. Laski attacked the concept of sovereignty and rejected that: (i) sovereign possess unlimited power, (ii) law is merely command of the sovereign, and (iii) state is a legal order.
Laski was inclined to accept the historical analysis of Henry Maine and his criticism of Austin’s theory. Henry Maine’s historical survey of authority and power of rulers showed that the non-legal factors like customs, traditions and conventions put a limit on the power of the sovereign. Henry Maine has cited the example of Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Punjab to show how he respected social conventions, customs and traditions. Laski also feels that no sovereign anywhere has possessed unlimited power.
Further, Laski refuses to accept that law is command of the sovereign. For him, the State does not create law, rather it is built on the general social environment and originate in community of groups. He cites the King-in-Parliament in Britain as a perfect example of sovereign power in Austin’s sense, if any. If law is command of the sovereign, then the King-in-Parliament can command to prohibit somebody’s religion or put limitations on it. However, we know this in practice will be almost an impossibility. Laski elucidates this limitation thus, ‘no parliament would dare to disenfranchise the Roman Catholics or to prohibit the existence of trade unions.’70 We can say that by pointing to these limitations, Laski seeks to demonstrate that law must be reconciled with social realities and social requirements. To show the influence of social pressure on the law-making power of the state, Laski in his Grammar of Politics says, ‘…we shall fail completely to understand the character of society, unless we seek to grasp exactly how the sovereign is compelled to will things desired by bodies in law inferior to itself.’71 Here Laski seeks to underline the idea that a variety of social, cultural and economic groups influence the law-making by the state. We find that his views regarding origin of law is in line with other pluralists like Duguit, Krabbe and MacIver who hold that law emanates from social conditions and requirements and not from the sovereign. As the group life in society reflects the natural and inner desire of people, law of the state cannot pretend to be based on anything than demands of these associations. For Laski, ‘what, in fact, it (the state) should largely seek to register as law is the body of demands it encounters among them (the associations) which represent the largest total of satisfaction in society.’72
Laski also rejected the idea that ‘there must be in every social order some single centre of ultimate reference.’ This means that Laski was actively against the idea of having a central power in every state and given the existence of variety of groups, he feels there is no logical requirement for a central authority as a source of law. Thus, Laski favours the federal nature of authority in society. Though Laski rejects need for a political sovereign in terms of a central authority, he accepts Dicey’s concept of political sovereignty, which gives primacy to the electorate to whom governments generally would not like to alienate. In his Grammar of Politics, he says, ‘Behind … the legally omnipotent authority it is not very difficult to discern an electorate to whose opinions and desires increasing deference must be shown.’73 For Laski, sovereign organs of government become nothing but a machine for registering decisions arrived at elsewhere. And this ‘elsewhere’ is apparently the electorate organized into associations. This makes Laski feel that the Austin’s formulation of sovereign as determinate and indivisible is not correct. Laski’s short point is that in practice, the concept of legally unlimited power of the sovereign in Austin’s sense is unworkable. He feels that certain fundamental rights given to citizens also put limitations on the sovereign. We can take the example of the Fundamental Rights provided in Part III of the Constitution of India. These Fundamental Rights put limitations on the legislative powers of Parliament and the judicial process protects the sanctity of these rights. Though there are reasonable restrictions on the exercise of these rights in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, public order etc., these reasonable restrictions could also be reviewed by the judiciary.74 All these go to deny ‘state as a legal order’. State as legal order implies that there is a definite body of men or organ of the state entitled by its position to impose its imperative upon its citizens. Laski seeks to prove that historically and legally this is not the case. He also rejects Rousseau’s concept of popular sovereignty and its elements of indivisibility and absoluteness.
Thirdly, Laski rejects the monist concept of sovereignty on political grounds. According to him, Austin’s theory of Sovereignty cannot fit as a theory of political organization particularly in federal set up. Political organization in the form of federal state makes it difficult to locate a determinate human superior. He cites the example of the American constitution with division of powers between constituents as a case in point. We can also take the example of Indian Constitution to elucidate Laski’s point. Though the Indian Constitution gives primacy to Parliament in legislative affairs pertaining to the country as a whole, the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India demarcates the legislative sphere of the States. However, one may argue that a unitary state then can be suited to Austin’s concept of sovereignty. But we have already seen Laski having refuted such a possibility in Britain, which is a unitary state. Further, Laski also cited the example of the Belgian constitution, which is a unitary state to show absence of sovereign organs in the Austinian sense.
Laski feels that historically, legally and politically Austin’s monist concept of sovereignty cannot be sustained. For him, it is more a conceptual formulation than a practical one, as in practice there is no absolute sovereign, either historically or legally or politically.
Concept of Pluralist Authority and Rejection of Absolute Sovereignty
Laski opposes the idea of a centralized power in a state. Like other pluralists, he thinks it neither practical nor required. The basic assumption that leads him to think so is his idea that since society is federal, authority must also be federal. Laski says, ‘… society, at the bottom, is essentially federal in nature.’75 Society consists of associations and groups, which are expressions of felt needs of men. The appeal of associations to their members is deep and members’ allegiance to these associations more effective because people have chosen voluntarily to express their outlook through these associations. At the heart of Laski’s criticism of the monist view of power is his rejection of a centralized power either in legal or political sense. Legally, the state is not the source of law and politically it should not be a repository of ultimate power. In his Foundations of Sovereignty, he says, ‘The monistic state is a hierarchical structure in which power is, for ultimate purpose, collected at a single centre. The advocates of pluralism are convinced that this is both administratively incomplete and ethically inadequate.’76 As a counter, Laski would like the State and its authority to be federal which, in essence, means its decision-making should be participative and based on consultation with those who will be affected by the result of its operation.
Federal nature of society requires that power in a state be dispersed, as this would make its operations more effective. Laski cites ‘three primary reasons’77 why authority should be federal. Firstly, ‘the more men have responsibility for the result of law, the more likely they are to be interested in its result.’ In a centralized state, obedience is not creative but mechanical and inert. Participative law-making and decentralized decision-making on the other hand, evokes sense of responsible cooperation. Secondly, ‘Centralization … makes for uniformity; it lacks the genius of time and place.’ Centralized administration will generally as a rule seek to avoid experimentations and novelty. Thirdly, ‘centralization … means an inability to cope with the problem of time in government.’ A centralized system would have to deal not only with a large number of issues but a variety of them. Due to pressure, many things that require consideration may pass without it or with it, at most, in haste. We find that Laski’s view of federal authority is opposed to the centralizing tendency of the state in the name of sovereign authority. Writing in the early 1930s, he argues that ‘centralisation was less dangerous a hundred years ago than now, simply because the ambit of state-activity was so much smaller.’78 Contrarily, now the State reaches in many aspects of the social fabric where flexible and rapid action is required. Given this necessity Laski argues for a more federal and dispersed authority. In India, we may say, the concept of Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies somewhat seeks participative and dispersed decision-making.
For Laski, federal authority and dispersal of power has to be in geographical as well as in functional terms.79 Thus, while London or Manchester or Paris or Delhi (in sense of urban municipal administration) should be fully responsible for and independent of the central government in all matters that are local in character, interest units like cotton industry, professional groups need their appropriate governmental institutions. In Laski’s support for geographical and functional basis of administration, we find the basis for administrative decentralization and industrial federalism. This implies federal authority both in political as well as in economic spheres. Laski, unlike the guild socialists especially Cole, does not support only functional representation. He, in fact, finds guild socialist position inadequate. This is due to the fact that if one cannot be represented as a citizen fully as the guild socialists say, one cannot be represented as an engineer or a doctor fully either. It suggests that Laski supports both territorial and functional representation supplementing each other.
His idea of federal authority, on the one hand, refutes the basis of absolute sovereignty by denying its necessity, and on the other, provides a reinterpretation of the doctrine of consent and representation. Federal authority and decentralized and participative decision-making becomes the basis for responsible and cooperative allegiance of the people towards the state. Herein also lies Laski’s solution for a legitimate democratic authority.
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