Those who favour the traditional approach have criticized the regularity assumption of behaviouralists, arguing that political reality is not uniform, and human nature and behaviour cannot be uniformly or regularly expressed. Further, human nature and behaviour are not amenable to objective study and as such no generalization is possible. Given the large number of social, cultural, economic and emotional variables, and also historical contingencies, regularity may not plausibly be achieved. Even if a general statement of regularity is achieved, the so-called scientific prediction based on regularity cannot go beyond the ‘if-then’ proposition.
The traditionalist argument against the verification assumption is that verifiable political behaviour constitutes only a small part of the whole political behaviour. By limiting political phenomenon in terms of only what is observable, behaviouralists in fact limit the scope of political science. Human behaviour is contextual and is also determined by institutional and social settings in which it occurs. As such, knowledge of the setting is essential. By focusing only on observable and verifiable political behaviour, behaviouralists ignore what lies beneath surface dynamics.32 Traditionalists feel that by ignoring non-observable and sub-surface dynamics, behaviouralists actually harm the cause of political science and limit its scope. The excessive emphasis by behaviouralists on empirically testable and verifiable propositions and hypotheses has led to the positivization of political science. This means that political enquiry has been limited to only whatever is testable and verifiable by external observation through the senses, and theory-building has suffered.
Traditionalists hold that techniques should not be exalted at the cost of content. By overemphasizing techniques, behaviouralists try to make political science fit sophisticated techniques. They study only those areas that are amenable to the techniques they advocate. Traditionalists question whether the technique applied by behaviouralists defines political science or whether the content of political science should define the technique. They settle for the latter.
Traditionalists object that behaviouralists attempt to quantify the unquantifiable and measure the unmeasurable. Political science deals with the very many significant questions and political problems that are neither amenable to quantification and measurement, nor required to be so.
Traditionalists feel that political science is concerned with values and ethical issues. Therefore, the search for value-neutral political enquiry is not desirable. They further hold that it is difficult for researchers to keep their preferences and value judgments away from their study. However, behaviouralists respond that by declaring their value preferences beforehand, this concern can be taken care of.
With respect to systematization, traditionalists argue that when low-level and middle-level theories are lacking in political science, it is premature to talk about overarching theories. Robert Dahl believes that ‘political theory in the grand manner can rarely, if ever, meet rigorous criteria of truth. In fact, in the search for general theories, behaviouralists have put forward various concepts and conceptual frameworks that are yet to be successfully operationalized. It can be said that the behavioural approach is limited in terms of its contributions to substantive research and theory.
Traditionalists have criticized the emphasis on the pure sciences by behaviouralists. Traditionalists hold that theory has no value unless applied to solving political problems. Crude empiricism is futile, and politically and socially irrelevant. They argue that applied research must get priority.
With respect to integration, traditionalists feel that the inter-disciplinary approach is useful in understanding political phenomena. However, they are apprehensive of the extent of influence of other social sciences on political studies and argue for the need ‘to preserve the identity, integrity and autonomy of political science.33
While it is true that there is an effort in all the social sciences to be more scientific and inter-disciplinary34 and as David Easton says, the behavioural approach represents a revolution both in technique and substance; it is more revolutionary in the field of technique and method than in the field of theory. Other limitations have been pointed out by political scientists and writers such as Heinz Eulau, J. C. Charlesworth, Leo Strauss, Mulford Sibley and Arnold Brecht, among many others.
Heinz Eulau feels that seeking regularity in the behaviour of individual actors does not automatically lead to generalizations or meaningful statements about the larger system. Given the fact that political science is interested not only in individuals but in the actions and policies of groups, institutions and states, the question arises as to how meaningful statements about larger systems can be made on the basis of enquiry into the political behaviour of individual actors. He hints at the problems that arise from the ‘fallacy of extrapolation’ when conclusions drawn from a study at a lower level are applied at the higher level. Second, he maintains that ‘it is necessary to distinguish between study of political behaviour and behavioural study of politics’. For the study of political behaviour, it is not necessary to use the concepts and methods of behavioural sciences. The only requirement is that the individual actor whose behaviour is described should be the empirical unit of analysis. In the behavioural study of politics, however, though the individual remains the unit of empirical enquiry, the theoretical units of analysis are groups, institutions, political culture, and so on. The behavioural approach has limited focus in terms of units of analysis and cannot explain processes and decision-making involved in complex institutional networks such as the State. Further, by focusing too much on processes and small groups or face-to-face behavioural aspects, it tends to neglect formal political institutions. While the importance of sociological factors like class, caste and ethnic factors in the sub-discipline of political sociology is appreciated, it should not be at the cost of ignoring the study of formal political institutions. While pressure groups, political parties, voters, public opinion, etc. are seen as ‘inputs’ of the political system, factors like government, legislature, executive, judiciary and bureaucracy are ignored.
J. C. Charlesworth, responding to the emphasis by behaviouralists on countable, quantifiable and measurable data, maintains that there are some very important elements in human nature like love, courage, patriotism, and so on, which are neither predictable nor measurable. ‘Behavioral studies are highly desirable to supplement other studies, but like all identifiable methodological approaches they are only part of the whole study of government and politics.’35
The behavioural approach may also fail to adequately account for various formal institutions due to its focus on informal processes, and as such it must be supplemented by other approaches.
Leo Strauss has criticized the behaviouralist approach due its fact–value dichotomy. He rejects the differentiation between political science and political philosophy and treats the latter as an integral part of the tradition of political thought. He is strongly critical of the behaviouralist approach, which he says ‘views human beings as an engineer would view material for building bridges’.36
Mulford Sibley has hinted that behaviouralism is not adequate in itself for understanding politics. He insists that values precede investigation and the investigator must have some notion of his/her own priorities before proceeding to use the behavioural approach. Behaviouralism can be used within a framework of value judgments, which are beyond behavioural techniques.
Further, the behavioural approach, by treating political phenomenon in terms of sociological or psychological categories, can reduce politics to ‘sub-politics’. Due to politics being seen as ‘a satellite of sociology’, it is seen as dependent on forces outside the political system. Therefore, it is important to demarcate the political boundary before attempting integration and inter-disciplinary study. Political analysts like Giovanni Sartori insist that political factors such as governments and parties affect political behaviour independently of sociological factors.
Arnold Brecht, like other neo-positivists, insists on the inevitability of value judgments in scientific investigations. As Brecht points out, without value judgment no end can be decided. At least at two levels the behavioural approach cannot avoid the involvement of value: setting goals that we seek as ends, and value preferences of the observer as regards what he/she thinks is significant for study.37 A charge from the Marxian perspective is that the behavioural approach insists on superficial social divisions and formations like elites, groups and parties and underplays the more acute class divisions. By doing so it serves the purpose of ‘stability’ and status quo. By its focus only on observable behaviour, the behavioural approach seeks to do nothing about the existing political arrangements, ‘which implicitly means that the status quo is legitimized’.38 Even the concept of democracy is not understood in terms of any value or equality, but is redefined in terms of struggle between competing elites, or what Dahl calls ‘polyarchy’. The traditional meaning of democracy is adjusted to subject it to the observable behaviour of groups, elites and individuals.
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